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ABSTRACT
Many studies of the American Civil War have considered why Mississippi leaders
voted to secede, while Kentucky politicians remained in the Union. Scholars have
previously focused on political elites to understand the underlying motivations behind
each state’s decision. These same scholars have often confined their studies to a synthesis
of why secession occurred nationally or at the state level. The question remains as to
what the common citizen saw and believed when faced with secession and if their views
matched their delegates.
This study utilizes the governors’ papers of John J. Pettus and Beriah Magoffin,
the Jefferson Davis papers, and Mississippi and Kentucky newspapers to compare the
views of citizens from two economically and politically similar states that responded
differently to secession. This thesis argues that middle-class Mississippians and
Kentuckians took action against a perceived Republican threat in similar ways between
1859 and 1861, but whose decisions concerning secession were ultimately affected by
their identities and founding ideals. Mississippians were increasingly devoted to states’
rights and sought to raise companies in order to defend their power and their state from a
possible northern invasion. Meanwhile, Kentuckians refused to support the North or the
Deep South, as they viewed both as having extremist ideals, and sought to protect their
independency from that same extremism. This study additionally engages the arguments
of historians Dwight L. Dumond, William H. Freehling, Timothy B. Smith, Elizabeth
Varon, and James W. Finck who offered an in-depth analysis on the roots and causes of
disunion.
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– INTRODUCTION

As January of 1860 drew to a close, citizens of Chickasaw County, Mississippi,
gathered together to discuss a series of recent resolutions that expressed a pattern of
continual indecision between maintaining or severing the Union for those in the Deep and
Border South. At first, Chickasaw citizens fervently expressed their loyalty to the Union,
“to the requirements of the compact” created when the nation was first established, and
“to the Constitution of the country.” They called to mind their respect and adherence to
past compromises between the sections, as well as their continued patriotism and defense
of “the rights and privileges of citizens of all portions of the Union.” They insisted that
they had not, nor any southern citizen, attempted to “plot against the lives, happiness,
security or property of any portion of our broad Union,” yet, in the eyes of these citizens,
the same could not be said of northerners and the “abolition organization” they
entertained. Instead, they were outraged by the perceived public sympathy shown to the
“hireling ruffians” like John Brown, his failed attempt to insight a slave insurrection at
Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, in October 1859, and the continued efforts by the North, “for
the purpose of dissolving our social system” in limiting slavery’s expansion to the West.
At the meeting’s conclusion, Chickasaw County citizens insisted that, although they
loved the Union, delegates should be elected to send to a “Southern Convention” in order
to make the necessary preparations to “take control of the government” if a Republican
president was elected.1

1

Weekly Mississippian, 25 January 1860.
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Elsewhere, every day citizens, like Charles C. Thornton, and the young men he
represented, were not concerned so much with supporting or dissuading disunion in 1859,
but instead were focused solely on what they saw as far more important. Rather than
disunion, Thornton emphasized protection of “Southern homes and firesides”—against
what he, and other citizens alongside him in Madison County, Mississippi, saw as an
“encroachment by Northern fanatics and abolishion incendiaries.”2 Moreover, these
concerns are mirrored throughout the letters and newspapers of white, middle-class
Mississippians and Kentuckians to their governors and politicians. While the debate over
particular events and later secession was heated during this time, this thesis will highlight
what was really going through the minds of every day citizens between 1859 and 1861;
citizens who saw themselves as loyal to the nation yet threatened by a section whose goal
it seemed was to eliminate slavery’s expansion and the South’s rights. In short, this study
captures what they feared most, what they favored, how torn they were in deciding how
best to protect slavery, their rights, and their futures, and how their states’ founding
ultimately influenced their decisions upon the eve of war.
Furthermore, this study specifically views these rising tensions prior and during
the secession crisis through the eyes of every day, middle-class citizens in Kentucky and
Mississippi; citizens who comprised “commercial and professional interests” such as
“bankers, merchants, doctors, teachers, lawyers, editors, dentists, and the clergy”,
farmers, and other literate individuals who might have owned a few slaves and whose
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Charles C. Thornton to John J. Pettus, 13 December 1859, Box 930, Folder 1, Item 20, State
Government Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
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voices were readily captured by newspapers and other written sources.3 Historians have
often overlooked how this particular group debated slavery, states’ rights, abolition,
secession, and government authority, focusing most of their attention and studies on elites
instead. This study argues that white, middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians were
vastly similar in their views on slavery, states’ rights, and the Republican Party as
sectional tensions escalated after John Brown’s attack in 1859. When Abraham Lincoln
was elected to the presidency, however, they chose two different courses of action in
1861 on how best to sustain what each state valued most—independency vs. power.
Both states’ middle-class citizens between 1859 and 1861 wanted to see slavery
continued, demanded that the North respect the South’s right to slavery, and wished to
see the Republican Party and abolition prevented from growing in power. Yet, what
drove middle-class Kentuckians’ towards the decision of neutrality was their value of a
particular type of independency, constructed upon the state’s founding. In their minds,
this independency meant guarding the ability to own land, providing for their households,
achieving financial success by their own merit, and upholding white racial and social
superiority through slavery. This value on an independence that consisted of a strong
devotion to slavery, a social hierarchy it helped to develop, and beneficial, economic ties
to both the North and the South pushed middle-class Kentuckians to favor neutrality even
when they and elite Kentuckians originally found themselves divided on what was the
best course of action for the state. Such a division followed them into the war but was not
equally experienced by Mississippians until the war began.

3

Jonathan Daniel Wells and Jennifer R. Green, eds., The Southern Middle Class in the Long
Nineteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 1, 7, 285-286.
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Meanwhile, embroiled with a continual desire for social and monetary success,
middle-class Mississippians’ found themselves united in their choice for secession in
order to maintain power. To this group, secession was seen as a method to protect this
form of power that gave them control over their reputations as honorable, masculine,
Christian men and over the wealth acquired through cotton and slavery, while the Union
was viewed as only leading to the their subjugation, poverty, and enslavement to the
Republican Party. In short, by looking at these early years in Kentucky and Mississippi,
and the events that occurred prior to the secession crisis, one ultimately captures the
reactions and influences among these core populations and allows historians to garner a
better understanding how each state’s founding ideas formed during that time caused two,
similar states to respond differently as war approached.
Countless historians have explored the causes of the Civil War, one of the most
important events in American history. This occurrence witnessed the severing of a
republic that the parents and grandparents of many Americans fought to build during the
American Revolution. In fact, during the earlier decades after its formation the simple
utterance of “disunion” was said to have sent chills up the spine of even the most
composed politician, as it echoed the fears of a failed “representative government” and
the emergence of despotism, oppression, and even slavery itself.4 Yet, for some radical
members of Congress in the following decades, disunion and subsequently secession
from a corrupt Union, was seen as a godsend, an opportunity to achieve lasting liberty for
societies in dire need of freedom and protection.
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Elizabeth R. Varon, Disunion! The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789-1859 (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 1-3.
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Historians have endeavored to understand why a Union once so united as to stand
against Great Britain ultimately separated by 1861. “Blundering politicians,” as historians
have so often described this generation of leaders, seemed to be the root cause of
disunion, where selfish and prideful representatives were viewed as incapable of finding
compromise through the 1850s and 1860s, and sought to achieve their own ends.5 Yet,
some scholars have pointed out that tensions between the sections had a history, and it
was only the failure to compromise and the increasing desire of southerners to
accomplish their own desires that led the southern states to secede in 1861.6
While these studies have included an overall understanding of the United States’
trials during the secession crisis of 1860 and 1861, other scholars have chosen to look
more specifically at the states that decided to leave the Union and their reasons for doing
so. Several have included comparative studies between states like Alabama and
Mississippi, or intriguing analyses as to what the citizens of the North were seeing,
thinking, and feeling during this crucial time. Few, however, have offered comparative
studies between the border and lower South in the secession crisis, especially while
looking closely at the reactions of every day, middle-class citizens through letters to their
governors and local, popular newspapers.7 Thus, it is this study that hopes to add to these
existing works concerning secession, the Border South, and the Deep South.
Mississippi and Kentucky have been the focus of many scholarly works, and
historians understand why one state chose to secede while the other remained in the
5

Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York, New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1983).
6
Elizabeth R. Varon, Disunion! The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789-1859 (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Joanne B. Freeman, The Field of Blood: Violence in
Congress and the Road to Civil War (New York, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2018).
7
William L. Barney, The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860 (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974).
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Union. Nonetheless, scholars have too often focused on elites to understand the
underlying motivations behind each state’s decision and have confined their studies to an
overall synthesis of why secession occurred from either a national or individual state
perspective. Additionally, these individual studies have also failed to fully encompass
each state’s reaction to the raid of John Brown and the approaching 1860 election—
events that pushed the South even closer to secession than ever before and that are crucial
in understanding why these state’s middle-classes advocated for union or disunion.
Therefore, the question remains: why did the common, middle-class citizen feel
threatened by Brown’s actions and later Lincoln’s election? What did the common
southerner see and believe when faced with secessionism and unionism? What did they
want accomplished by their leaders? And were their views and desires accurately
represented by their delegates? Recent scholarship underscores that secession
conventions better captures the opinions of elites, and studies like this one hope to
capture popular white, middle-class attitudes on secession regardless of gender.
This study utilizes the papers of governors John J. Pettus and Beriah Magoffin,
the Jefferson Davis papers, and Mississippi and Kentucky newspapers to compare the
views of middle-class citizens from two economically and politically similar states that
responded quite differently to secession. This thesis demonstrates that middle-class
Mississippians and Kentuckians were equally alarmed by the arrival of the Republican
Party and the doctrines they supported. Each state was also strongly supportive of states’,
or southern, rights—a belief not only in the right to hold slavery but also in a state’s right

6

to govern its own decisions and future.8 While their understanding of independence and
power consisted of these particular rights, it was ultimately how to best protect these
important ideas, and the practices they included, that both states began to differ over
time, especially as 1861 began. Holding onto their faith in America’s political system,
middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians sought to defeat the Republican Party
through the election of 1860. When these attempts failed, they led their states onto
different routes in order to protect their independency or, in the case of Mississippi, the
power they held over their social and economic lives. More specifically, by 1861,
Mississippians were increasingly devoted to states’ rights and moved swiftly to raise
companies and seek secession, as it was seen as the only solution to protect slavery, their
honor, and their wealth from a section they viewed as seeking to destroy and enslave
them. Middle-class Kentuckians, on the other hand, refused to support either the North or
the Deep South, and viewed both as having extremist ideals that would harm the
economic ties they had spent years developing between both sections, which had assisted
them in achieving independency. In addition, the Bluegrass State denied secession due to
the belief that it would eliminate the laws that protected slavery and refused to side with
the North, as doing so would mean possibly fighting against their sister states in the
South. Overall, these separate responses from Kentucky and Mississippi citizens were
shaped by their value of white supremacy, honor, masculinity, and economic success
which were concepts that made up their ultimate goal of achieving either independency
or power over themselves, their slaves, their money, and their states.

8

William J. Cooper, Liberty and Slavery: Southern Politics to 1860 (Columbia: University of
South Carolina, 2000), 137-139, 178-184, 256-258, 267-268.
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This study will additionally engage the arguments of historians Dwight L.
Dumond, William H. Freehling, David Potter, Timothy B. Smith, Elizabeth R. Varon,
and James W. Finck, who each offer an in-depth analysis on the roots and causes of
disunion. From politics to masculinity, these scholars investigate secession through
different methods of interpretations and have documented the causes and effects
nationwide. Yet, they have not applied these same findings at the state level, especially
among middle-class citizens. While these studies help to provide an overall
understanding of the events during this time, as well as the attitudes of northern and
southern politicians, this thesis will subsequently add to these same arguments. It argues
that middle-class citizens in Mississippi and Kentucky acted on perceived northern
threats in similar ways starting in 1859, but by 1860-1861, responded differently to
secession than what previous scholars have noted in politicians and elites.
Nonetheless, the historiography surrounding secession contains scholars who
have noted the importance of various factors in heightening the sectional conflict, such as
politics, despotism, and disunion rhetoric. Written in 1931, Dwight L. Dumond’s The
Secession Movement argues that secession was both a well thought out process by
southern politicians and a failure by the North to comply with southern demands and
compromises. While originally willing to negotiate, northern resistance and the later
election of Lincoln solidified the southern politicians’ belief that only by severing the
Union could their society and the institution of slavery be conserved. This study will
reveal that such an argument was true at the local level, as well, where middle-class
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citizens viewed Lincoln’s election as an end to negotiations with the North.9 More
specifically, Michael F. Holt’s The Political Crisis of the 1850s follows in Dumond’s
footsteps in arguing that a failed two-party system caused sectionalism to explode within
the nation. Only then, it seemed, did the nation abandon national parties, accept sectional
parties, and turn slavery into a disuniting topic in order to maintain political power.10
William W. Freehling in his two volume work, The Road to Disunion, expands
previous studies by tracing disunion from the American Revolution to the Civil War. His
goal is to understand why secessionists triumphed so suddenly in 1860 when
compromises had always stifled fire-eaters’ call for secession. According to his findings,
secession occurred due to southern elites influencing events, politics, and people to get
what they wanted and later push the nation towards disunion. Although united in this
sense, it is later viewed that the South was, nonetheless, divided in its approach towards
secession and how it should be conducted.11 Far more intriguing is Elizabeth R. Varon’s
exposition on the power of words in driving a nation apart. Taking an interesting turn in
the historiography, Varon’s Disunion! follows the many ways in which the word
“disunion” could have fed Americans’ fear of a failed Union, as well as its use by
politicians to discredit opposing parties between 1789 and 1859.12 Alongside Varon,
Joanne B. Freeman connects violence in Congress with the sectional crisis, stating that

9

Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861 (New York, New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1931).
10
Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York, New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1983); Additionally, David M. Potter’s Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (New York, New York:
Harper Perennial, 2011) can also be consulted in order to understand the nationwide political atmosphere
leading up to the secession crisis.
11
William H. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 (New York, New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), vii-ix.
12
Elizabeth R. Varon, Disunion! The Coming of the American Civil War, 1789-1859 (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 2008).
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the Civil War began in Congress as politicians, following the desires of the citizens they
represented, turned to honor and violence in order to maintain their states’ rights.13 While
informative in describing the overall atmosphere of the nation at this time, it is the goal of
this study to disclose how the findings of Dumond, Freehling, Varon, and Freeman might
have played out quite similarly and differently at the local level, specifically among
Mississippi and Kentucky middle-class citizens.
Besides scholars who have presented an overall examination of why secession
occurred, others have studied individual states and their reactions towards secession.
Timothy B. Smith in The Mississippi Secession Convention argues that the convention in
Mississippi resulted in a multitude of consequences, such as the production of
secessionist and cooperationist factions, a lack of communication and agreement among
delegates, and the growing concern that delegates were acting upon their own desires
instead of the people’s will.14 Likewise, Christopher J. Olsen’s Political Culture and
Secession in Mississippi examines how the state’s emphasis on masculinity and male
honor—formed during settlement—caused the state to favor antipartyism and later
secession. In depending on personal relationships to elect delegates and prove one’s
masculinity, Olsen argues that Mississippians antiparty character caused them to take
political insults personally, and eventually secession became the only method of

13
Joanne, B. Freeman, The Field of Blood: Violence in Congress and the Road to Civil War (New
York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2018).
14
Timothy B. Smith, The Mississippi Secession Convention: Delegates and Deliberations in
Politics and War, 1861-1865 (Jackson: The University Press of Mississippi, 2014); For additional
information concerning the political atmosphere in Mississippi, consult William L. Barney, The
Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi n 1860 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1974). Barney gives a more broad understanding of secession and politics in Mississippi, while comparing
it to Alabama simultaneously.
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maintaining the state’s honor.15 Both of these works will be examined and added to
extensively within this study, examining how white, middle-class citizens took northern
actions, comments, and criticism as a threat against their honor and communities and
whether Mississippi delegates at the secession convention truly represented their citizens’
desires or sought to accomplish their own objectives.
Meanwhile, historians have also sought to understand Kentucky’s peculiar stance
as its Deep South neighbors began to leave the Union. Historian James W. Finck in
Divided Loyalties notes the struggle Kentucky experienced as it chose to remain neutral
amidst factions who spoke for or against secession. Arguing that Kentucky chose
neutrality as a means to maintain its economy and keep slavery, Finck goes into immense
detail in describing the stances of various factions who considered secession with
hesitancy and explaining why those same factions saw neutrality as more favorable.16
Alongside Finck, Gary Matthews’s title alone encompasses his argument. In More
American than Southern, Matthews argues that based on Kentucky’s original settlement
and its connections to surrounding states, the state was seen as an “anomaly”—having
both Northern, Southern, and Western attributes within its society. It was these same
attributes, he states, that governed Kentucky’s decision towards neutrality.17 Lastly,
Michael D. Robinson’s A Union Indivisible explores secession in Kentucky through a
region-wide study that focuses on the entire Border South. He argues that Unionists who
sought to avoid war “approached the crisis as had their forbearers,” like Henry Clay, in
15
Christopher J. Olsen, Political Culture and Secession in Mississippi: Masculinity, Honor, and
the Antiparty Tradition, 1830-1860 (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
16
James W. Finck, Divided Loyalties: Kentucky’s Struggle for Armed Neutrality in the Civil War
(California: Savas Beatie, 2012).
17
Gary Matthews, More American than Southern: Kentucky, Slavery, and the War for an
American Ideology, 1828-1861 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2014), 4-16.
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order to end the political unrest caused by slavery and further prove that only the Union
provided complete protection for the institution. While Robinson highlights the
importance of “interstate cooperation among Unionists” to keep their states in the Union,
this study hopes to reiterate the importance of middle-class citizens’ views, how each
state’s ultimate decision regarding secession was mainly their own, and that the views
and decisions of the middle-class and the elite were not so dissimilar.18 Overall, however,
this study will add to these existing arguments, showing how their understanding of
independency contributed to middle-class Kentuckians’ decision to remain neutral.
Ultimately, Smith, Olsen, Finck, Matthews, and Robinson confine their studies to
political leaders and neglected to focus on the attitudes and concerns of every day citizens
as compromise with the North failed and secession became more appealing. While these
studies are important, as the majority of decisions made in states and the nation were
directed by political leaders, it is equally valuable for one to understand that the common,
middle-class citizen was not immune to these issues or remained silent during this
national crisis. Citizens within these states, specifically in the South, had their own
concerns and acted on those concerns in order to protect their societies, but also did not
believe that secession was always the answer. This study will capture the voice and
anxieties of white, middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians, showing how the
response to secession documented by previous scholars was experienced differently at the
local level. It will also reveal that middle-class citizens from both states acted in various,
and sometimes similar, ways until 1861, where viewing their state as a separate,

18

Michael D. Robinson, A Union Indivisible: Secession and the Politics of Slavery in the Border
South (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 6.
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independent entity in relation to the nation or as consisting of individuals who valued a
certain level of power ultimately affected their decisions towards secession.
In order to fully encompass the attitudes and concerns of Mississippi and
Kentucky middle-class citizens prior to the secession of the southern states, several
archival sources were investigated and utilized. As this study wishes to capture the
thoughts of two states, diaries and personal letters could not be the only sources relied
upon. Most middle-class citizens, hoping to make a difference in the political decisions of
their respective states, would write either to their governors or newspapers, and these two
sources are used extensively within this study. Specifically, Newspapers.com, the
Library of Congress’s Chronicling America, and Genealogy Bank are websites that
offered easy access to digitized newspapers. These online resources provided a method of
obtaining the views and feelings of citizens who occupied the upper lower-class to the not
yet elite, upper middle-class and also information on where in the state they were located,
allowing one to see if particular areas within the state were more inclined to support
secession or continue to cooperate with the Union. It is also important for this study to
use specific newspapers in order to understand what was happening locally and within
the state, as newspapers often reflected the feelings and sentiments of the public they
were writing to, especially if they wanted to procure funds. Newspapers help to capture
specific events occurring statewide, as well, such as the mustering of companies, local
uprisings against abolitionists, economic turmoil, possible fears over slave insurrections,
or invasions from surrounding states. Lastly, newspapers assist in documenting the
reactions of the citizens to particular legislation, passed nationally or locally, and what
steps citizens desired to be taken to enact or repel it.
13

Unpublished and digitized collections of Mississippi governors’ papers were
acquired from the Mississippi Department of Archives and History located in Jackson,
Mississippi. As John Jones Pettus was the governor of Mississippi during the time of the
secession crisis, his papers were sorted through in addition to his executive journal and
military telegrams.19 Furthermore, the Kentucky Historical Society’s Civil War
Governors of Kentucky contains the digitized papers of Beriah Magoffin, as well as his
executive journal and military telegrams, which have been transcribed for easy use.20 The
edited papers of Jefferson Davis, compiled by Lynda Lasswell Crist and Mary Seaton
Dix, written between 1859 and 1861 were also consulted, as letters to and from
Mississippi and Kentucky were often received by Davis during these times.21
Nevertheless, there were weaknesses identified when using these particular
primary sources. Whereas Kentucky newspapers were an invaluable resource to utilize
during this study, only two newspapers from Louisville, Kentucky, were found that
addressed events such as John Brown’s raid, national conventions, and Lincoln’s
election. These two newspapers consist of both unionist and secessionist sentiments, and
where possible, other state presses quoted within these Louisville newspapers were
utilized. Yet, a wider variety of newspapers would need to be accessed for future studies
concerning Kentucky’s middle-class. In addition, while searching through each state’s
governor’s papers, very few letters addressed the raid of John Brown. While there were a
few discovered in Mississippi that addressed abolition, more letters were found that

19
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pertained to the events in 1860 and 1861. Therefore, in order to fully encompass the
thoughts and actions of middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians, newspapers were
used more often concerning John Brown’s actions than in chapters to follow.
The decision to focus on the years 1859 to 1861 was affected heavily by the
presence of three key events that pushed the South closer to secession and caused
compromise to become almost impossible: John Brown’s raid, the Democratic and
Republican National Conventions, and the Presidential election of 1860. In order to
understand why these events solidified sectional tensions and what was increasing or
decreasing support for disunion among white, middle-class Mississippians and
Kentuckians, local newspapers and the governors’ letters were studied in-depth.
Additionally, and due to the mass quantity of these resources, specific key words were
chosen in order to narrow down the search. For example, key words such as John Brown,
uprisings, insurrections, Lincoln, Bell, Breckenridge, Douglass, Republican National
Convention, Democratic National Convention, fire eater, disunion, and secessionist were
located within letters and newspaper articles throughout the research period, either by
hand or through online search engines. In condensing these resources in this way, one
garners exactly how citizens reacted to these events as a whole, what they believed the
solution to sectional tensions were, what was in danger, who or what was threatening
their state or the nation, and why secession or neutrality was chosen.
In all, this thesis will explore how middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians
responded to trying events prior to disunion, and why these citizens chose secession or
neutrality during the secession crisis. Chapter Two will focus entirely on the reactions of
the middle-class to John Brown’s raid and a perceived abolitionist threat. It begins its
15

analysis by offering a brief overview of Kentucky and Mississippi’s formation of their
own identity that valued either independence or power—ideals that consisted of many
practices and later affected their decisions during the secession crisis, which will be
explored further in future chapters. Next, in analyzing the raid on Harper’s Ferry, this
chapter argues that middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians blamed the teachings of
abolitionists and the Republican Party for driving John Brown to action, yet differed
when deciding what steps should be taken towards protecting slavery and their rights
from future threats. Denouncing the Republican Party’s doctrines and the North’s
rumored approval of Brown’s actions, middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians
nevertheless acknowledged several northern cities’ attempts to reassure the South of their
devotion to the Union. Fearing that more insurrections might occur, however, both states
refortified their state militias and increased surveillance of both slaves and suspicious
individuals.22 Such methods were taken not just to protect slavery, but to maintain an
independency and power that consisted of social and economic privileges for free, white
males. Nevertheless, white Kentuckians maintained their faith in America’s democratic
system, believing that peace and union could still be achieved through appropriate
compromises. Mississippians, meanwhile, found themselves split between factions that
either sought to reassure the public that compromise was still possible and a more
moderate group that believed the state might have to resort to secession should their
rights be threatened further by the North. In the end, and despite their fears, middle-class
Kentuckians and Mississippians continually advocated for the preservation of the Union;
For more information concerning the history behind Mississippi’s militia and the organization
of it, see Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865 (Gregg
Revivals, 1993).
22
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although, fire eaters and more moderate advocates of secession, specifically in
Mississippi, began insinuating that compromise and militias would not be enough to
protect their state’s rights, especially if a Republican president were elected. This visible
rift among unionists and secessionists among middle-class citizens’ will also add to
William W. Freehling’s argument that a majority of southerners desired to postpone
secession until all southern states chose to secede together.
These reactions are also shown to be directly tied to each state’s identity and what
they cherished the most. Citizens viewed themselves not as Americans, but as southern
confederates united in their efforts to sustain power over their slaves, honor, wealth, and
futures or as Kentuckians, whose independence was linked to slavery’s privileges and
who pursued solutions that protected both this independency and institution. Such a focus
will build on studies by Honor Sachs, Gary Matthews, Christopher J. Olsen, and William
J. Cooper, who focus on what created citizens’ identities in the South and Kentucky
between 1776 and 1860 and how it influenced their lives. 23 Lastly, the governor’s papers
of John J. Pettus and Beriah Magoffin, and local newspapers, assist to illustrate the
concerns, motivations, and actions of citizens in October 1859 to March 1860 prior to
national conventions.
Chapter Three explores the Republican and Democratic Conventions during the
hotly contested presidential race between April and November 1860. While middle-class
Kentuckians and Mississippians were preoccupied with the results of both conventions,
as well as the abandonment of the Democratic convention in Charleston by southern
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delegates, they were not consumed by discussions for or against the Union. Instead, this
chapter argues that middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians had not lost faith in
America’s democratic system and believed that slavery, the Union, and southern rights
could still be protected if a specific presidential nominee was elected. For instance,
middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians were mostly torn between John C.
Breckenridge or John Bell, as either was seen as the perfect candidate to protect slavery
and the Union, while deeming Lincoln and Douglas as far too radical to support. More
specifically, supporters of Bell were drawn to his support for the Union and continued
compromise, as choosing Breckenridge was viewed as a vote for possible disunion in the
future. Supporters of Breckenridge, on the other hand, favored his strong pro-southern
platform and saw Bell as a secret abolitionist who would see to slavery’s extermination.
Again, middle-class citizens’ favor of either candidate was influenced by their desire to
sustain unique ideas that each group valued and which could not survive if certain
aspects, like slavery or the Union, were eliminated. In the end, middle-class, and some
elite citizens believed that the nation’s future would be decided by the presidential
election and waited for the outcome before drastic measures could be taken. Popular
newspapers, and the governors’ correspondence from each state, are used to support these
arguments. In addition to the use of newspapers and letters, the studies of Olsen, Finck,
Matthews, and Robinson are also added to, as this chapter takes a closer look at the 1860
presidential campaign within these studies often neglected in previous studies. Overall,
this chapter will emphasize that while middle-class citizens were similar in what practices
and beliefs they valued, they ultimately differed in which presidential candidate they
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believed would protect these beliefs and what they feared might happen should a
Republican president be inaugurated.
Chapter Four examines the aftermath of the election of 1860, the rise of Abraham
Lincoln as president, and the secession crisis as a whole. This chapter argues that both
middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians were unsupportive of a Republican
president and did not approve of his later actions at Fort Sumter. Most Mississippians
believed that all hope was lost and that the power they held over their political and
economic rights, social honor, and the system of slavery could not survive beneath a
hostile president who insulted and threatened the South with subjugation and inequality.
Thus, they saw secession a more suitable option for their state. Such a decision was
affected by their desire to maintain power over their own lives, and secession was seen a
that violent action, similar to dueling, that would guard this power by preventing
subjugation, sustaining their honor as southern, white men, and protecting their
communities and wealth from harm.
While disapproving of Lincoln, middle-class Kentuckians split in regard to what
action needed to be taken following his election. Prior to Fort Sumter in April, a number
of citizens favored secession, while a much larger faction supported the South’s rights
while also seeking compromise. Following the attack on Fort Sumter, however, the
Bluegrass State saw class divisions as they determined what course should best be taken
by the state. Yet, as most middle-class and elite Kentuckians were more preoccupied with
protecting their independency, that is, their economic ties to both sections, slavery, and
their privileges as white males from outside forces, rather than siding with a particular
section, these divisions were soon discarded in favor of an option they believed protected
19

them the most. .24 Nevertheless, while supporters of neutrality called on Governor
Magoffin to provide arms, and protect the borders from runaway slaves and abolitionists,
other middle-class citizens detested the legislature’s decision to remain neutral, as they
saw their rights as threatened by a Republican president and preferred to side completely
with the South. Many even wrote to prominent figures, including Jefferson Davis and
John J. Pettus, to support local, pro-secession companies preparing for war. Such actions
were, too, influenced by Kentucky’s peculiar identity, where citizens often identified
themselves as purely Kentuckian, rather than southern, northern, or American. This
identity crisis will advance the studies of Honor Sachs and Gary Matthews, who both
examine Kentucky’s identity between 1792 and 1861 and how the state viewed itself in
relation to other states. 25 Such a study will require the utilization of Governor Beriah
Magoffin, Governor John J. Pettus, and the Jefferson Davis papers, as well as local
newspapers, to document the concerns of Kentuckians and Mississippians from
December 1860 to July 1861, completing the groundwork needed to adequately compare
two fairly similar states, its middle-classes, and their decisions as war approached.
In all, scholars such as Michael Holt, William W. Freehling, Dennis J. Mitchell,
Lowell H. Harrison, and James C. Klotter emphasize these instances, as well as the
actions of prominent politicians and southern elites in fanning the flames of disunion, but
at the local level, southern, middle-class, white citizens were often more consumed with
fear and the need to protect their independency, power, and practices when it came to
James W. Finck, Divided Loyalties: Kentucky’s Struggle for Armed Neutrality in the Civil War
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their decisions regarding secession.26 The Conclusion of this study will summarize these
findings, but will also offer a synthesis of what occurred in each state after July 1861.
Ultimately, this study does not overshadow the importance of politicians in leading their
states into their respective decisions, and even shows that the views of politicians and the
middle-class were often similar despite brief instances of class differences. Yet, while
this thesis shines a light onto the thoughts and concerns of every day, middle-class
citizens during the secession crisis, it also shows that what influenced the choices of
politicians and middle-class citizens the most was their love of independency or power.
In the end, these values, and what they consisted of, were so cherished that they caused
two states that once stood side-by-side to diverge onto different paths.
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– “BLOODY HANDS TO HOSPITABLE GRAVES”: KENTUCKY AND
MISSISSIPPI’S RESPONSE TO JOHN BROWN’S RAID, OCTOBER 1859-MARCH
1860

As tensions fluctuated across the nation, Kentucky’s Governor Beriah Magoffin’s
December address was relayed to Mississippi newspapers, capturing the unity, disgust,
disdain, and fear spreading throughout the South in late 1859. “Since the recent
developments of the North, and the Harper’s Ferry affair,” he began, “Kentucky is more
thoroughly sound and united than ever,” and he vowed that the state would stand by her
sister states in both sections. Nonetheless, in regard to the “monstrous doctrines of the
Republican Party,” Magoffin expressed the perceived threat towards slavery and southern
white families, believing that “all slave states are threatened” as well as “the Constitution
and the Union” by this new party. And although John Brown had been arrested and his
plans for a slave insurrection thwarted, Magoffin sought to “adopt sufficient measures of
protection” and also self-preservation for Kentucky.27 In fact, after the raid on Harper’s
Ferry in October, middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians viewed John Brown’s
actions as an attack on southern rights and blamed abolitionists and, more importantly,
the Republican Party’s platform, for driving him to such measures. Ultimately, these
citizens chose to take action against these perceived fanatics in similar and different ways
in the hopes of protecting practices that made up the independency and power their
ancestors had fought to obtain.

27

The Daily Mississippian, 13 December 1859.

22

These two similar, yet very different, societies who saw themselves threatened
found their beginnings prior to the American Revolution. At the time, colonists longed to
expand the young republic into the unknown expanse of the Ohio and Mississippi
Valleys, and for settlers such as Daniel Boone and Anthony Hutchins, that dream became
a reality. Setting out “in quest of the country of Kentucke” in 1769, Boone described his
adventures into the “wilderness” fraught with brutal winters, wild animals, and Indians.
Yet, he continued to explore the land, seeking “domestic happiness” for his family and
the opportunity to provide a young nation with the hope of growth.28 Likewise, Anthony
Hutchins, a native a South Carolina searching for a chance to start over with his family,
ventured into the lands around modern-day Natchez, Mississippi. While French planters
had failed to cultivate the area due to conflict with local Indian tribes before trading it to
the British, who also abandoned it for fear of conflict with the Spanish across the
Mississippi River, Hutchins successfully settled near St. Catherine’s Creek for
“opportunity or political reasons.” There, along with his 500 slaves, Hutchins was able
survive off of subsistence farming and slowly acquired more land from the Indians as the
American Revolution began.29
By the end of the revolution, more settlers poured into the yet to be established
states of Kentucky and Mississippi. Settlers in Kentucky, like Boone, saw this area as
much more than a place to grow crops and hunt game. To them, Kentucky offered white
males with an independency that included patriarchal authority, mastery through land
ownership, and economic stability that would lead to the protection and provision of their
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families.30 For those in Mississippi, settlers from the Carolinas, Tennessee, and Georgia
fled from the “old states” to the “new Canaan” in the hopes of starting over from “failed
tobacco farms” and to reap the benefits of cotton, which had already found success in
Natchez.31 Such desires embodied the hopes of all Americans during and after the
American Revolution—the opportunity to become masters of their own lives, households
and fortunes. Yet, to accomplish their dreams, settlers not only had to oppose and
overcome Indians and speculators, they also faced unfulfilled dreams and societies that
were slowly beginning to change due to location and the success of specific crops. Their
actions in response to these issues ultimately shaped their identities and their later actions
in the 1860s.32
Forming an Identity
The production of the identity as “Kentuckian,” which affected citizens’
responses to slavery and the economy later as disunion approached, was subsequently
formed by the state’s original settlement and their understanding of independency. The
first settlers of Kentucky in the early 1700s sought to carry on the ideas established by the
American Revolution: independency through land ownership and mastery of their
households. Those ideas faced a harsh reality when Virginia gentlemen secured the
majority of lands and the lower classes were left as tenants depending on wage labor for
survival.33 This created a large population of powerless, landless, poor men who had
nothing in common with the powerful elite, saw no need to defer to them, and could not
30
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participate in politics. Realizing that they needed the poor’s support in order to remain in
power, and as they applied for statehood, elite Kentuckians crafted “a political consensus
that privileged whiteness and manhood over wealth and land ownership as prerequisites
for civic life.”34 Although this precursor did not lead to drastic changes in the dependent
poor man’s landless condition, it did give him power simply by being white while the
elite gained the loyalty of the lesser classes. Even without land, all white males enjoyed
suffrage due to the color of their skin. In addition, by 1800, slave codes were adjusted to
limit the mobility of African American slaves, who found themselves unable to hire
themselves out for wages. In elevating the status of poor whites through suffrage and
separating the economic and social worlds of freemen and slaves, poor white men had
gained a significant amount of influence and independency in Kentucky simply because
of their whiteness.35 In this light, Kentuckians resistance to abolition and the desire to
find the best avenue to keep slavery during the secession crisis was linked to their
identity as privileged white males.
Moreover, the white population in Kentucky gained economic advantages when
African Americans remained in slavery. Should slavery be discontinued, and slaves given
the opportunity to establish their own lives freely, whites would find themselves once
again competing for jobs and watching “the value of their labor diminished” similar to
the early decades of Kentucky’s settlement.36 Historians have also pointed out that an
influential middle-class emerged after the War of 1812. Before, lower-class Kentuckians
34
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found it difficult to gain wealth simply as yeoman farmers, but with the help of the
market revolution, industrialization, and Kentucky’s geographic location, new avenues
for economic prosperity emerged. Simply put, entrepreneurship was the key. By entering
the market as an artisan, manufacturer, or one associated with the mercantile enterprise
and saving enough money by participating in the “merchant and manufacturing cultures”,
the working, middle-class, white male achieved economic independency.37
Kentucky also established a diversified economy tied to both sections of the
nation through agriculture, trade, and manufacturing. With its unique position, citizens
were allowed to reap the benefits of its climate and create specific trade routes with both
the North and the South. For instance, the Mississippi River allowed Kentucky to trade
goods and foodstuffs to the South, while railroads and increased manufacturing in the
North not only created substantial markets but also other options for Kentucky’s white
middle-class to gain wealth.38 Thus, “the state’s exports” became “important to both
North and South.”39 It is possible, then, that middle-class citizens voting for neutrality
later in 1861 might have done so to protect their privileges as white men, sustain the
economic stability they had achieved through trade and manufacturing, and prevent
further competition with African Americans. In others words, in choosing neutrality and
protecting these specific privileges, they maintained their independency, whereas
secession might have equaled a loss of one, if not all, of these cherished practices.
While middle-class Kentuckians were developing a society and identity
strengthened by slavery and the variety of economic opportunities through trade and
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manufacturing, middle-class Mississippians developed their own, unique identity linked
to having power over specific aspects of their lives and that eventually affected their
decisions in the 1860s, as well. In the Mississippi territory, the expulsion of Indians from
fertile lands allowed settlers to spread and settle rapidly throughout the territory. Even
so, white development came slowly to Mississippi, and communities were often
separated by long distances. Thus, white settlers relied more on their family and
neighbors for survival rather than the government. Over time, they developed a sense of
“mutual loyalty among men,” while establishing Mississippi’s idea of masculinity. To be
considered a masculine, honorable man within society, Mississippians required courage,
loyalty to one’s community, and protection and leadership of home and family. This form
of masculinity was always under scrutiny by the community, and men needed to keep
their reputation and identity’s intact by continually proving themselves to the community
or sustaining their honor when it was challenged by another male, often through
violence.40
Mississippi’s code of honor not only instructed men to respect those of a higher
class, as “wealth was a sign of inner virtue and personal success,” but it emphasized that
upward mobility was possible for all white men.41 For settlers, the possibility of gaining
social and economic prestige in Mississippi grew more promising with cotton’s success
beginning in the late 1700s. Such economic appeal encouraged further migration into the
territory and increased competition among men, as they became more focused on
obtaining wealth, success, and honor through cotton growth over anything else.42
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Yet, revealing one’s power over others through violence and monetary success
was not the only method men used to express their masculinity, loyalty, and honor.
Mississippi communities also utilized brutality and violence against slaves in order to
prevent insurrections and test a man’s commitment to the community and their families.43
Such an emphasis on brutality and economic gain eventually affected the relationship
between master and slave. Before, the frontier master and slave had once shared a
“mutual respect for one another’s humanity,” but settlers had “lost their love of nature
and their fellow man” in exchange for wealth achieved through cotton.44 Also, relations
between master and slave continued to change when a depression decreased the price of
cotton. Mississippians not only temporarily turned to new agricultural practices and crops
to survive until the cotton industry recovered, but also devised ways to control a much
larger slave population. Stricken with the thought of being a minority, whites created
strict slave laws and increased brutality.45 In the end, while originally questioning
slavery’s legitimacy in the midst of the American and French revolutions, the growth of
cotton, the Haitian Revolution, Christianity’s justification of the institution, and
Mississippi’s focus on honor allowed for slavery’s continuation and the protection of
planters’ wealth and honor.46 To eliminate such a practice as slavery, then, would affect
men’s power over their own reputations, wealth, and the social hierarchy that white
Mississippians benefited from, which was an option they were not willing to consider as
1861 approached.
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This emphasis on a society based on communal loyalty, masculinity, and violence
affected politics in Mississippi. Because communities were so remote, and due to
communities’ value on face-to-face personal relationships, voters were more willing to
elect those they knew personally rather than a particular party’s doctrines and who would
best protect the communities’ interests. Therefore, it was difficult to form strong political
parties within the state prior to 1860, in addition to settlers refusing to travel such long
distances to attend political meetings. In the end, Mississippi politics reflected the spirit
of antipartyism where political parties were unable to completely take hold of a
population that valued personal relationships and communal protection over party beliefs.
Olsen also argues that such developments made politics far more personal in Mississippi
and in the South as compared to other sections of the nation. In other words, when
politicians evaluated or insulted southern institutions, southern men often took it as a
personal attack to their honor, values, and communities. In order to maintain their identity
as “good men and good Christians,” such insults often included violent reprisals, such as
dueling, that assisted men in maintaining their honor and masculinity. As will be seen in
future chapters within this study, secession and the election of Democratic politicians was
also seen by middle-class Mississippians as appropriate methods of maintaining their
honor, equality, and way of life in the South.47
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By the 1840s, the state’s settlement and cotton not only changed relations
between the races in Mississippi, but ultimately created the state into a “patriarchaldominated land of plantations” that shaped its growth, economy, and politics.48 Honor
and masculinity determined a man’s place in society where all white men were
considered equal, having the ability to vote, achieve success, and protect their community
due to their skin color. Some historians, however, have argued that in reality particular
groups within the antebellum South found social and economic success nearly
impossible. Charles C. Bolton and Keri Leigh White’s studies on poor whites in the
South reveal that this group experienced landlessness, joblessness, and poverty due to
slavery and the dominance of the planter class. While poor whites appreciated the
privileges their white skin achieved, such as voting, this group nonetheless found it
difficult to achieve social mobility due to planters using a number of methods to stifle
and socially immobilize them. By defunding education, initiating poll taxes, and resorting
to threats and violence, poor whites were prevented from rising up in defiance against
poverty, planters, slavery, and later secession.49 Nevertheless, as a whole, Mississippi
society taught white men that monetary and social success could be achieved through
effort and virtue.50 Yet, while white Mississippians enjoyed having and maintaining
considerable power over their reputations, wealth, slaves, and communities, they also
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created a society that took political insults personally as an attack on one’s honor and
values while simultaneously clashing with the rest of the nation.
The Turmoil of the 1850s
While their societies were established differently, Kentucky and Mississippi
nevertheless shared stark similarities, such as superiority of the white race and a heavy
dependence on slavery not only for economic gain, but also for racial dominance. Yet,
the arrival of the 1850s saw those beliefs tested. Following the war with Mexico, and the
possession of several new territories, both sections debated where the new states of
California, New Mexico, and Utah should be classified as slave or free. Already, the
South recognized “the extension of southern boundaries [as] vital for the maintenance of
political power essential for protecting basic southern interests” and battled with northern
politicians who had expressed their disdain for slavery’s extension.51 Henry Clay,
however, satisfied sectional tensions through the Compromise of 1850.52 Unfortunately,
the establishment of popular sovereignty, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the failure of the
Whig Party, the caning of Charles Sumner, and the emergence of the Republican Party
only intensified animosities between the sections. By then, the South accepted the belief
that the North held “the distinct idea of hostility” towards them and slavery’s extension.
They based this belief on the Republican Party’s view of slavery as a “relic of
barbarism,” as well as the publication and declaration of prominent leaders and followers
of the party.53
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By the late 1850s, the South had grown even more alarmed by the Republican
Party due to the publication of Hinton Helper’s The Impending Crisis of the South: How
to Meet It and William H. Seward’s “irrepressible conflict” speech. Published in 1857,
Helper, a North Carolina native, asserted that slavery was the cause of “Southern
backwardness and the South’s inability to keep pace with the free states.” The young
writer claimed that “slaveholders [had formed] a ‘tyrannical’ and ‘inflated oligarchy’”
and urged nonslaveholders to snuff out slavery, for only a “lily-white, free labor South”
would improve land prices and promote “entrepreneurial progress” on par with the
North.54 While these were the proclamations of just one man, the South grew infuriated
that a fellow southerner had made these assertions, and associated Helper’s teaching with
the Republican Party when “over sixty House Republicans endorsed the book” in a letter
written in 1859.55
Furthermore, William H. Seward deepened southerners’ beliefs that the North was
out to abolish slavery completely and destroy southern society. In his Rochester speech,
Seward declared that the country consisted of two sections—“one resting on the basis of
servile or slave labor, the other on the basis of voluntary labor of freeman.”56 According
to him, these “systems” were “incompatible;” moreover, because the “slave system”
needed to obtain “all political power” and “represented principles antithetical to freedom,
democracy, compromise, and repose,” to which the free-labor North supported, the two
sections were antagonistic and compromise was no longer possible. According to Varon,
Seward thus painted a picture of the North leading a “violent conquest” where only force
54
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and the reclamation of “the territory they had lost and conceded” could establish freelabor throughout the nation.57 In short, there would be “an irrepressible conflict between
opposing and enduring forces” where the United States must become “either an entirely
slaveholding nation or entirely a free labor nation.”58
While the Louisville Journal’s editors regarded this “declaration. . .[as] intended
to be regarded simply as a theory,” other Kentucky citizens insisted that this doctrine
proved that “it [was] the North against the South and the South against the North.”59
Democrats across the South believed that Seward had declared “a war of extermination
against slavery” and provided “evidence that the Republicans [were] resolved to invade
the South” and “exterminate southern institutions.” Writers in the Semi-Weekly declared
that Seward had further proven his hostility towards the South when stating that Helper’s
book was “a work of great merit—rich, yet accurate, in statistical information, and logical
in analysis.” 60 In short, these speeches and letters from prominent Republicans only
increased the South’s paranoia over the party’s intentions for the nation’s future. To most
white Kentuckians and Mississippians, not only did the North intend to eliminate a
practice that privileged them socially and financially, but in doing so, while this is not
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specifically stated in the sources, would eliminate their ability to express their honor,
maintain wealth, and eradicate economic competition.
By 1859, however, middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians watched these
national issues over slavery and their fears concerning the Republican Party come to a
head. In a nation reeling over recent, bloody events in Kansas where pro- and anti-slavery
settlers battled over the state’s future, an abolitionist set his sights on Harper’s Ferry,
Virginia, in order to end slavery permanently. Having escaped punishment for murdering
several pro-slavery settlers in the Pottawatomie Massacre in Kansas in 1856, John Brown
made preparations to incite an insurrection in the slaveholding states. With over twenty
men, Brown captured the federal arsenal but never acquired the swells of slaves he hoped
would arise to assist him. On October 17, 1859, Brown and several of his men were
captured, and although Brown had not seen the success of an insurrection, he nonetheless
inspired a deep sense of fear within the Border and Deep South.61
Brown’s raid became the first of three events that strengthened sectional tensions
within the United States and solidified the South’s fears over the Republican Party’s
“irrepressible conflict” doctrine, while weakening their faith in the nation’s democratic
system. White, middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians offer useful comparative
analysis of how these events, fears, and a weakening faith were expressed in the Border
and Deep South. In addition, it is important not only to capture the reactions of these
states’ citizens to growing sectional tensions, and what they found most threatening, but
also to understand what influenced two vastly similar states to split in regard to secession.
Previously, past historians have sought to understand these two states’ actions through
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the study of its politicians. While such studies are crucial, it is equally vital to know what
every day, middle-class citizens were concerned and fearful of the most during events
like John Brown’s raid and if their thoughts were similar to that of the delegates they
elected. Therefore, studies into the newspapers and a few choice letters covering the raid
reveal that both states were extremely alarmed by the Republican Party’s abolitionist
doctrines, blaming them for influencing Brown’s actions and feared that more violence
was to come. Although their expression of anger and fear over the Republicans,
abolitionists, and future insurrections were similar, however, both states differed in
regards on what action to take in order to protect the rights and practices that maintained
their independency and power.
Kentucky’s Response
Following Brown’s arrest, Kentucky newspapers were flooded with articles from
northern presses. Northern states struggled to reassure the South that they did not approve
of Brown’s actions, and that southerners had nothing to fear in regard to further violent
actions against their treasured institutions. Following the raid, one such press assured that
the “whole of the power of the country” would fight to protect the South from
insurrections, while also ensuring that should fanatics—North or South—instigate revolt,
the northern states would be more than willing to capture and deliver them to justice.62
Union meetings across New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts also sought to
reassure the South that not all northern men advocated for the South’s downfall.
Attendees of these meetings, instead, expressed their “discountenance” towards
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“sectionalism in all its forms” and sanctioned Brown’s punishment.63 Furthermore, they
voiced their desire to maintain the Constitution and “the rights of states”, believing that
slavery was “a social necessity,” according to one Pennsylvanian, and that it would be
“pitiless wanton barbarity to cast [slaves] loose and wild—it would be an act of selfslaughter for the whites.”64 Other northern citizens closer to Kentucky specifically stated
that Republicans were not intent on seeing slavery ended through violence, but that the
matter would be settled “peaceably by an amendment of the Constitution and laws of the
several Southern States themselves.”65 These assurances, however, appeared to not quell
the fear and anger that most middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians felt towards
Brown, abolitionists, and the Republican Party as they continued to cover the event.
For white Kentuckians, when they were not providing coverage of Brown’s trial,
they devoted most of their time pinpointing who they believed was really to blame for
Brown and what the assailant’s intentions were for the South.66 The Louisville Daily
Courier’s editors stated that these “insurrectionary movements were the inevitable results
of the building of a purely anti-slavery party” who “stood at the [ultra-abolitionists’]
backs,” “encouraged them to work,” and “furnished them with means” to carry out their
plans.67 To middle-class Kentuckians, abolitionists and more specifically the Republican
Party had not been satisfied with the “Kansas work” and sent “old John Brown to carry
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on the ‘Kansas work’ in Virginia.” These groups also believed that “stealing negroes,
resisting the execution of the fugitive slave law, and fomenting insurrections” was “doing
service to both God and man.”68 Following the raid, Hardin, Rowan, Breckenridge, and
Hopkins County citizens specifically regarded the attack on Harper’s Ferry as “the first
gun of the ‘irrepressible conflict’” and the “abolition party” against southerners who had
the right to have their slaves protected.69 Through Brown, Republicans brought their
doctrines to life and “intend[ed] to make the slave states of the Union all free,” while
pursuing “continued efforts… to reduce the Southern States to the position of mere
dependencies in the Union.” In turn, “their followers,” these citizens believed, “[would]
endeavor, if they have the strength, to carry it out.”70 In the end, one middle-class
Kentuckian called on the state’s politicians to stand against such a party, stating that
those who “would not oppose a Black Republican with all his might and main” and their
doctrines would become “the most deadly enemy of the Union, and particularly of the
Southern States.”71
Despite this disdain towards the Republicans and Brown, however, middle-class
Kentuckians nonetheless continued to show their devotion to both slavery and the Union,
viewing current events as no cause for dissolution. While Magoffin proclaimed that
Kentucky’s slave property and families were threatened by “this new party with its
monstrous doctrine,” and reiterated his state’s loyalty both to slavery and their friends in
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the southern states, his state had also not forgotten their loyalty to the Union, as well.72
On February 27, 1859 at the Louisville Masonic temple, Kentucky met alongside
representatives of Tennessee, Ohio, and Indiana, where they “mingled their voices
together,” to express their “sentiments of patriotism, fraternity, and loyalty to the Union.”
This meeting also revealed the states’ belief that the time had come for “the people of the
North and South . . . [to] understand each other, [to] cultivate the sentiments of
brotherhood and thus perpetuate the ancient fellowship and good will.”73
Local counties, also, took the opportunity to express their devotion to upholding
the Union by explicitly denouncing dissolution talk. Henry, Mason, and several other
county citizens passionately resisted “to the utmost any combination of the North or
South, which, in any event, look[ed] to the dissolution of the Union as a cure for the
present evils of sectionalism and [declared themselves] for the Union and the
Constitution.” These counties also restated their goal not to interfere “with the rights of
others guaranteed to them by the Constitution and laws,” including the South.74 Asserting
that “the institution of slavery, in the States where it existed, should not be molested” and
would be defended “by all the guarantees of law, of morals, or of all the physical force,”
residents like those in Mason County stressed their desire “in reconciling the people of
[their] common country once more.” Kentuckians also questioned secessionists on what
benefit dissolution would produce, as it would not allow them to expand into the
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territories nor cease the outrage from northerners against slavery.75 Ultimately, even
though white Kentuckians felt an “ennobled fear that patriots [felt] for an imperiled
country,” they desired that the “South obey the laws of [the] country” and to “summon
the pure elements of conservatism and truth that…can [be found] in the northern states”
in order to stave off disunion and civil war.76
Nonetheless, expressing their desires to uphold the Union and slavery
simultaneously did not mean that middle-class Kentuckians’ concerns over abolitionists
like Brown were overlooked. Prior to 1859, Kentucky showed little tolerance for
extremism and anti-slavery talk, yet abolitionist sentiment existed throughout Kentucky’s
history. At the 1792 and 1799 constitutional conventions, several Presbyterian and
Baptists ministers advocated for slavery’s end, labeling blacks as equal to whites, whose
“moral and political virtues” were harmed through black enslavement. In 1808, the
Kentucky Abolition Society was established where members worked to ban slavery,
educate blacks, and publish pamphlets to educate Kentucky, as well. By 1832, Kentucky
also had around thirty-one colonization societies, where members believed that instead of
assimilating free blacks into society they would help these individuals leave the country.
In the end, they succeeded in sending only 658 freed slaves to Africa.77
By 1859, abolitionists and Republicans were still active in the state, as seen at the
Republican State Convention in Newport, Kentucky, where representatives were elected
to the national convention to be held in 1860. Yet while these representatives were
“determinedly opposed to servile insurrections” and “[held] slavery . . . open to the will
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of the legal majorities,” Kentucky newspapers still associated them with abolitionism but
regarded “this whole movement as insignificant” as Kentucky was more pro-slavery than
ever before.78 Other Republicans within the state, however, took more determined
measures to spread anti-slavery sentiments, and the state reacted in open hostility towards
such actions.
For example, having created a local antislavery printing press, a mob in Newport
chose to destroy the printing presses in October 1859.79 Elsewhere, John Fee, a Kentucky
preacher, had established an antislavery community in 1854 in Madison County,
Kentucky. After constructing fully functioning churches and schools, Fee sent his
“agents” to the surrounding slaveholding and nonslaveholding homes to administer
Bibles and antislavery booklets. Eventually, Fee made preparations to integrate local
Berea School in order to train both black and white “pilgrims” to spread the gospel of
Christ and of emancipation throughout Kentucky.80
After Brown’s raid, however, surrounding communities saw Fee as a threat to the
state and met him with violence. One Madison County resident found Fee to be a
nuisance and stated that the county “had long been cursed with a number of abolitionists,
which her citizens [were] determined to remove,” while others suspected Fee of housing
Sharp’s rifles that had been shipped to him from the North, as if he planned to start an
insurrection similar to Brown’s.81 A committee meeting of the county later decided that
Fee was “an incendiary character…at war with the best interests of the community” and
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formed a posse to expel him from the state.82 Later the Louisville Daily Courier’s writers
condoned these actions, deeming them “justifiable,” as Fee’s teachings had already
caused slaves to “manifest a spirit of insubordination.” In fact, in one instance, a slave
refused his master’s orders and upon being reprimanded assailed his master alongside
other slaves.83 Driven by what had occurred in Virginia, other communities followed and
ordered anti-slavery supporters “to leave Kentucky terra firma instanter,” as “[they] could
get along without foreign interlopers and [could] manage [their] own affairs without
assistance from abroad.”84
According to rumors in southern presses, by March 1860 these same abolitionists
returned to Kentucky. A Mr. Hanson, “with 25 or 30 associates” crossed the borders into
the state, but was promptly asked to leave by a Madison County committee. In response,
“Hanson’s company replied by firing on the committee” before barricading themselves
inside a nearby building, and the committee and the Governor sent the military to subdue
the abolitionists.85 Thus, as a result of the alarm over Republican teachings and Brown’s
raid, most middle-class Kentuckians resorted to violence to prevent further insurrections
from local abolitionists who threatened a practice Kentuckians’ independence depended
on.
By the time these events occurred, however, more political measures were taken
in order to prevent further violence within Kentucky. Ignoring the free state moderates’
condemnations of Brown, Magoffin noted the abolitionist threat in the $100,000 worth of
82

Louisville Daily Courier, 10 December 1859; Robinson, A Union Indivisible, 28.
Louisville Daily Courier, 19 January 1860.
84
J.M. Harris to T.F. Marshall, 27 January 1860, Governor’s Correspondence, KDLA quoted from
Robinson, A Union Indivisible, 41; Louisville Daily Courier, 6 January 1860 quoted from Robinson, A
Union Indivisible, 41.
85
Semi-Weekly Mississippian, 30 March 1860.
83

41

enslaved persons that escaped from Kentucky each year. Upon this revelation and what
had occurred at Harper’s Ferry, he issued a bill “to prevent free negroes from coming to
the state, under any circumstances, and provid[ed] the removal of that class of population
from the limits of the Commonwealth.” A writer to the Louisville Daily Courier, who
went by Timothy, simply stated that he “did not want [freemen] here,” and openly
supported the governor’s intentions to possibly force these individuals back into slavery
should they be found guilty of specific crimes.86 Overall, however, several county
residents exemplified that more measures needed to be taken in order to secure the state
from abolitionists.87
Notably, in November, as Magoffin made provisions to reorganize the state
militia, one Kentuckian writing to the Bardstown Gazette believed that such organization
was required to control future situations like that seen in Harper’s Ferry.88 Boone County
residents, writing to the Frankfort Yeoman, stated that John Brown’s raid served as a
“warning” to Kentuckians and that the state militia needed to be reorganized so that
Kentucky, “as a border state, may be prepared to defend her rights” while the “the free
negro population,” seen as a threat, should be immediately removed.89 Additionally,
Logan and Hancock counties added their growing “horror” over the teachings of the
“Black Republican Party,” while also calling on “all lovers of the Constitution and the
Union” to stand against the abolitionists “so fraught with peril and mischief to our
country” through an assemblage of a militia and the need of an “Executive” who
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respected the constitutional rights of each state and not just the country as a whole.90
Elsewhere, the editors of the Louisville Daily Courier insisted that the militia be
assembled, trained, and armed as the “wicked machinations of anti-slavery fanatics”
threatened the state, as they had in Virginia, whose militia was credited with saving the
state from the “insurrection” of John Brown.91 Reassembling the militia, therefore, was
not just a way to protect the state from further violence, but also a message to the North
that Kentucky considered abolitionists and Republicans a real threat to their state and its
ideals.
After expressing their desires to see the militia reorganized, middle-class
Kentuckians soon saw those desires become a reality as citizens across the state
volunteered and sought arms. As early as December 1860, Louisville city leaders boasted
on the reorganization of the “Louisville Rifles” and insinuated that militia mustering
would continue in the future.92 Also, as volunteers flooded the National Blues and
Marion Rifles armories for supplies, Magoffin ordered local police forces and authorities
to be strengthened. He also sought to increase “slave patrolling” across the state and
asked volunteers to wait “for marching orders.”93 Thus, while concluding that Brown’s
actions did not warrant overt action like secession, middle-class and elite Kentuckians
took measures to ensure that insurrections similar to Brown’s raid were prevented
through increased watchfulness of African Americans and the reorganization of the
militia.
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It was not uncommon, however, to see oppositional views interested in slavery’s
end or of secession itself. As already seen, several abolitionists established communities
and compelled slaves to leave their masters before crossing the borders into freedom.
Others took to the press or podium (such as Cassius M. Clay, a politician who believed
that slavery stifled Kentucky and whites’ economic growth) to relate their desires to see
emancipation enacted.94 Most newspaper sources, however, do not indicate that there was
wide support for secession within Kentucky, oftentimes using the terms “secessionist,”
“disunion,” “disunionist,” or “fire eater” to address individuals located outside of the
state—labeling them as southern fire-eaters, for example, before expressing Kentuckians’
disdain at the mere thought of disunion as a solution to current affairs.95
Writers in the Louisville Daily Journal, however, hinted at one instance of
disunion in a neighboring newspaper, the Democrat, and its belief that “the Declaration
of Independence sanctifies the power of a people to alter or abolish forms of government
when it ceases to answer its purposes,” alluding to their support of secession should the
need call for it.96 Yet, while this was only one clear example of secession talk and does
not reflect a larger support for secession in Kentucky, this does not mean support did not
exist. As will be seen in future chapters, those in favor of disunion became relatively
outspoken about the desire to see Kentucky secede, specifically following Lincoln’s
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election. In 1859, however, in addition to not openly supporting secession, the majority
of middle-class Kentuckians had not given up hope in finding compromise in regard to
the slavery question, yet were firm in their belief in the South and Kentucky’s right to
slavery, as well as its protection by any necessary means.
In the end, one historian deemed Kentucky to be increasingly a “proslavery
Unionist” state, and newspapers and letters during 1859 agreed with such a label for the
border state.97 While not ignorant of the problems encircling the nation in regard to
slavery and expansion, middle-class Kentuckians’ indicated a refusal to discuss secession
and chose not to give up hope in the Union when the doctrines of a seemingly hostile
Republican party took shape in Brown. The majority of white Kentuckians denounced
Brown’s actions, abolitionists, and the doctrines of Seward and the Republican Party,
demanding that the right to slavery in the South be respected. Nevertheless, they sought
to have that right upheld within the confines of the Constitution and the Union itself, as
other options were viewed as only harming middle-class Kentuckians’ independency and
the practices that went along with it, including slavery.98 While reorganizing the militia
was a method used to maintain peace and offer protection from future insurrections,
white, middle-class Kentuckians continued to show a simultaneous support for both
slavery and the Union. Such was the case because these Kentuckians were not just
patriotic, they were also advocates for slavery—an institution that bolstered their
independency and was believed to be best protected in the Union with its current laws, as
will be seen in later chapters. Secession, they believed, would only “accelerate the
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extinction of slavery” and also directly affect white Kentuckians’ by increasing their
competition for jobs and weakening their influence in society and politics.99
Even so, the issues that surrounded slavery had yet to be resolved, but middleclass Kentuckians had faith in the nation’s “vibrant two-party system,” as well as the
“democratic system” that would ultimately protect the citizens’ interests and find
compromise about these particular issues.100 In sum, middle-class Kentuckians were not
anti-slavery in 1859, nor were they anti-Union. The Union was just as important as
slavery, even among the Democratic Party, and far more important than siding with the
North or the South, who could not offer the complete benefits they were already enjoying
in terms of economic success and racial supremacy in the Union.101 Middle-class
Mississippians, on the other hand, whose reactions to Brown’s raid were similar to
Kentuckians’, were nevertheless split in regard to the Union and secession after the raid
itself.
Mississippi’s Response
While past scholars have often painted Mississippi as staunchly pro-secession
throughout the 1850s, findings within local newspapers in response to Brown’s raid
reveal middle-class citizens responding in similar and interesting ways compared to
Kentucky. While not as numerous as the border state, newspapers in Mississippi
continued to recognize the presence of Union meetings in places like New York and
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Detroit.102 For example, a writer in the Ripley Advertiser documented a union meeting at
the Academy of Music in New York that “[approved] of the punishment of the Harper’s
Ferry invaders,” “deplored of the introduction of the slavery question in party politics,
and agreed to respect laws, truth and judicial decisions in reference to slavery.”103 The
New York mayor and several businessmen went further in creating resolutions at another
Union meeting, stating that “the Constitution, the treaties, the laws of the United States,
and the judicial decisions thereupon, recognize the institution of slavery as legally
existing.” They also regarded the “recent outrage at Harper’s Ferry a crime” and
denounced any and all acts that would “make [the] Union less perfect . . . or disturb its
domestic tranquility or to mar the spirit of harmony, compromise, and concession.”104
More northerners later sided with New York’s vow to the Union, “[abhorring] the crimes
of John Brown and his confederates” and pledging themselves to “discountenance and
[opposing] sectionalism in all its forms.”105
White Mississippians were not easily convinced, however, by these pledges and
vows. Instead, some argued that these union meetings were not representative of the
entirety of the North. Middle-class Mississippians, therefore, devoted themselves to
pointing out northern hypocrisies from the past and present to support their belief that it
had always been inimical towards the South and had paved the way for Brown’s attack.
For example, in response to these meetings, a writer to the Semi-Weekly Mississippian
boldly stated that “such demonstrations poorly compensate[ed] the slaveholding states for
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the positive aggressions which they are constantly suffering at the hands of the Northern
States.” In other words, the writer questioned how genuine these meetings were when
“the Black Republicans carried the state elections, by overwhelming majorities” or
permitted laws where “a citizen of a Southern state, for traveling within the limits of
Michigan with his slave property [was] liable for imprisonment in her State
Penitentiary?” To these Mississippians, “faith [would] not do without works” and the
North needed to prove their devotion to the Union and respect for the South by purging
abolitionists from its ranks.106
Elsewhere, citizens continued to document what they saw as the North’s
hypocrisy by noting instances of support for Brown’s actions in the present day. While
parts of the North boasted of respecting slavery’s existence in the South, southern
columnists reminded readers that “[northerners had] taught the doctrine which the
Harper’s Ferry outlaws [had] sought to put into practice” and “[had] sown the seeds of
disaffection, rebellion, and disunion.”107 Newspapers also displayed mass meetings in
Boston that “loudly applauded” and deemed Brown “an instrument in the hands of the
Almighty for the accomplishment of good results,” and an Anti-Slavery Society that
granted Brown “a place in the calendar of Black Republican saints,” urging its members
to “observe the tragical event” of Brown’s execution and continue their work to eradicate
slavery “which [was] a burning disgrace and fearful curse to the whole country”.108 In
Natick, Massachusetts, northerners’ believed that “resistance on part of the slave and of
the North, against slaveholders, is the one great idea of the people,” believing that the
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“sin of [the] nation . . . is to be taken away, not by Christ, but by Brown” and those like
him.109 Ultimately, in addressing these disturbing instances, middle-class Mississippians
looked to the North’s past legislation, its praise for Brown, and Republican teachings to
show the public that this section was seemingly more devoted to seeing the South
demolished rather than protected, as these union meetings had hoped to reveal. They
feared “the spirit that [guided] the councils of a Black Republican Administration.” This
administration, they believed, drove men like Brown to violent action, and they
questioned the “great…calamity” that would befall the nation if a Republican was
inaugurated.110 Nevertheless, knowledgeable of these alleged instances of northern
aggression, another group of middle-class Mississippians voiced their hope for continued
compromise despite a possible Republican rule.
Surprisingly, throughout the state, a few counties and citizens rallied their support
behind the Union and their desire to continue to maintain their rights despite the fear
produced by John Brown. One columnist used resolutions created in Hickman County,
Kentucky, to reveal that Mississippians desired their brethren “throughout the nation to
come at once to the great landmarks of the Constitution . . . and aid in maintaining our
rights and preserving the union of these states.”111 Those in Salem, Mississippi, further
embodied this unionist feeling in constructing resolutions that stated “they were not in
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favor of severing the Union on any frivolous pretext, but [desired] to maintain it with our
rights fully recognized.”112
Not denying that there were northern and southern extremists, a Vicksburg Whig
writer took a more positive approach to the issues at hand in “[cherishing] an abiding
faith that the Union of these States [would] continue to exist” as fanatics like those in the
North “embrac[ed] only a small portion, comparatively, of the population.” This
newspaper also contained an argument that most northern citizens were not abolitionists
but “union-loving, patriotic, conservative men . . . ready and anxious again to organize
on the platform laid down by Clay and Webster—who ardently desire to preserve the
Union.”113 Additionally, Whig party members of Hinds County boldly declared their
opposition “to all Disunion conventions,” and the “continuation of the present fierce and
hostile agitation of the slavery question . . . [perceiving] no existing cause for a
dissolution of the Union.” These writers also wanted to promote “a spirit of harmony and
fraternity between the different sections of the Republic” similar to communities within
Kentucky, as previously noted.114 One Brandon Republican writer even took a more
comical stance on the disunion discussion, asserting that he did not “intend to go out of
the Union,” but if the rest of the state did, he would be more than happy to continue
writing newspaper columns for himself while establishing his own government.115
Upon reacting to Brown’s raid in a similar fashion as Kentucky and producing
two different factions—those that pointed out the North’s perceived aggression towards
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the South and those who advocated for unionism—middle-class Mississippians also
chose to take action in the form of military preparations against insurrections and a
possible Republican president. While expressing their outrage at the North, white
Mississippians revealed several threats within the state after the raid. Following Brown’s
arrest, authorities discovered maps at Kennedy Farm where Brown had once resided
across the Potomac River. One map included Mississippi, where nine counties were given
special attention. According to the Weekly Vicksburg Whig, “one of the insurgents at
Harper’s Ferry, traveled through Mississippi, and kept Brown and company posted in
regard to the disposition of slaves.” Not only did these travelers mark the number of
whites, they added, but also the number of slaves within the county. The Whig writers
advised both the state and other southern states to “keep a strict look out upon suspicious
strangers,” as these individuals might have been preparing slaves for more
insurrections.116 Several eyewitnesses in Oxford, Mississippi, even believed that in 1857
Brown had traveled to Oxford, as “an itinerant repairer of clocks,” but was really there
“for the purpose of observations and laying plans to incite the slaves to insurrection.”117
These fears only seemed to be realized as more reports came into the hands of
newspaper editors and the governor himself. Following Brown’s arrest, an anonymous
abolitionist wrote to Governor John Jones Pettus to warn that a number of Irish and
northern men had accumulated arms and munitions outside of Vicksburg, Mississippi.
Their plan was to take Vicksburg, Jackson, and several parishes within Louisiana, forcing
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the captives, like Mississippi officials, to pass laws freeing the black population.118
Elsewhere in Kemper County, citizens noticed the presence of two men who had been
driven out of South Carolina for their abolitionist beliefs. The writer stated that “there
ought to not be two opinions about the course to be pursued,” and that if these men
wished to preach doctrines that forced Brown to action at Harper’s Ferry, “they ought to
[be] ‘welcomed with bloody hands to hospitable graves’.”119 Like Kentucky, middle-class
Mississippians increased surveillance of abolitionists within the state, and as they did,
one Kentuckian warned that “death [was] certain” to abolitionists “who [came] into the
Southern States to incite insurrection, and to arm slaves for the massacre of their masters
and families.”120
As troubling as these instances were to middle-class Mississippians, their choice
to keep watch for any possible insurrections within the state was not their only course of
action. They also established the means of preparing for future assaults from the North, as
well. Despite the union meetings occurring northward, the Semi-Weekly asserted that
unless the North change its ways and get rid of all abolitionism, Mississippi needed to
“prepare to defend against every assault [on] her sacred rights with all the powers by
which the God of nature has endowed her.”121 J. R. Anderson at Tredegar Iron Works of
Virginia additionally advised Governor Pettus to begin making preparations for her
defenses in order to ensure the continuation of southern society and slavery itself.122 R.W.
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James, friend of the state treasurer, even desired to deliver 3,000 rifles and muskets to
better arm Mississippi, to which Pettus refused at the time.123
Later, Charles C. Thornton wrote that the “signs of times” demanded that the state
provide for its militia and that it was the duty of all “southern states” to summon eligible
young men to serve in the militia, as they had already begun to gather in Madison
County, Mississippi. In making these preparations, he believed, the North would see that
the South was willing and able to stand against northern encroachment and abolition.124
Another local Mississippian recommended that the state “at once be armed for its
defense,” as John Brown and the events of Harper’s Ferry revealed the intentions of the
North.125 As a result of these petitions, and while some historians have contended that
Governor Pettus did little to take military action for the state, the governor did enact laws
allowing for the arrest and enslavement of all free blacks who did not leave by July the
following year, as well as the removal of their right to own property in the state. Pettus
also saw to legislation that collected over 4,000 muskets for the state.126 Newspapers and
letters later confirmed this movement to arm the state, as a letter from Washington D.C.
to the governor gave the state permission to draw out 295 muskets for the state’s
militia.127 Alongside this legislation, the state legislature also authorized the
reestablishment of the state militia by February “and appropriating $150,000 to the
purchase of arms, so as to place [the state] in readiness for whatever consequences” may
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come from the North.128 Therefore, not only did most middle-class citizens believe that it
was necessary to make preparations for their defense against abolitionists, the state also
took measures to keep freemen in check and defend against other hostile entities who
might threaten them and the valuable institutions that gave them such power over a
variety of areas in their lives. Yet, local fire-eaters pushing for secession gradually made
their presence known throughout the state and the South once more, while even
moderates voiced their assertions that more than the militia may be required of the state
should sectional tensions escalate.
While Mississippi fire-eaters’ call for immediate secession seemed drowned out
by the much louder call for Union in the state’s newspapers, the Vicksburg Whig writers
specifically pointed to their active presence in areas throughout the state. According to
one writer, two groups of Mississippi fire eaters existed—one that was “always angry,
always excited” and who always “place public affairs in a crisis” and another group “who
under the guise of devotion to the South, are constantly plotting and scheming the
dissolution of the Union.”129 Being critical of the fire eaters’ “work of treason” and their
continued attempts to promote secession, the Whig addressed the movements of the first
group in highlighting their plan to schedule a southern conference in Atlanta. Through
such a conference, fire eaters hoped to establish a sense of unity and create a course of
action for the southern states in the future.130 This was seen as the work “of a few
dissatisfied partisans” and “not the people,” even if the governor approved of such
actions and had already sent a commissioner to Virginia—a state whose “participation
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was almost mandatory” due to the attack of John Brown.131 In addition, while fire eaters
were attempting, and failing, at calling for an Atlanta convention, this group also
supposedly “invaded the sacred precincts of learning,” ordering the removal of a northern
born professor in Oxford” and advocating for only southern professors at state
universities.132
Yet, sources also addressed the presence of the moderate, second group of
secessionists in 1859—those who supported the Union, but advocated for its destruction
should southern rights continue to be threatened, especially by a Republican president, as
these rights not only included slavery, but Mississippians’ ability to govern their own
affairs. To them, Brown’s actions “meant much more than a mere isolated insurrection on
the periphery of the Upper South. Rather, Harper’s Ferry appeared as both a precedent
and a premonition” of what would come later.133 One conservative politician claimed that
the state “must also look at the possible, if not probable, necessity for dissolution, and
firmly meet the requirements that such necessity will call forth” if hostilities continue.134
Tippah County, Mississippi, citizens even asserted that it would choose to secede should
the North not respect its rights, while a writer to the Semi-Weekly more specifically
expressed that Mississippi would “withdraw from the Union in the event of the election
of a Black Republican.”135 In the end, the legislature itself sided with this particular
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group, presenting a resolution that vowed that the election of a Republican president
whose policies they believed threatened slavery and the South’s rights “[justified] the
slaveholding states in taking counsel together to for their separate protection and safety,”
insinuating that the state would not hesitate in considering to take drastic measures or
“resist . . . to the bitter end.”136 In all, Mississippi promised to hold “no quarter for those
individuals who ‘assumed a revolutionary position toward the South’.”137
While few in number, writers in the Whig and past historians have highlighted the
movements of fire-eaters to move the state towards secession. Yet, as their words and
actions did not seem to be in abundance following John Brown’s raid, they might not
have seen the event as wholly justifying secession as of yet but nonetheless sought to
unify the southern states at Atlanta and portray secession as a favorable option, especially
if it became probable in the future and if sectional tensions increased.138 Thus, unionists
in the state might have felt more compelled to voice their opinions and beliefs in local
newspapers and towards the public in order to reassure the masses that the Union was not
lost and that hope remained despite Brown and the Republicans’ perceived actions
against slavery and ultimately their right to have power over their institutions and lives.
Most middle-class Mississippians, therefore, were far more fractured than
Kentuckians when it came to their reactions towards Brown, but stood united in their
attempts to protect their power over an institution that contributed to their reputations and
wealth. While the border state acknowledged the North’s actions, the majority of its
middle-class population held their hope in compromise. Mississippi’s middle-class, on
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the other hand, found itself split into groups of unionists and those who believed that
secession was their only option if their right to slavery and their power continued to be
threatened. While fire-eaters sought unification among the southern states in Atlanta and
moderate Mississippians struggled to reassure the public that hope in the Union was still
possible, citizens acknowledged their fears of further insurrections by abolitionists,
slaves, and freemen. Legislation was quickly passed to ensure that the militia was ready
to put down such acts, while local abolitionists and freeman were ordered to leave, either
peaceably or by force. These middle-class Mississippians did not see Brown’s actions as
an adequate excuse to leave the Union just yet, as many mentioned secession only if
hostilities intensified. Nonetheless, they pursued protection from certain groups they
believed sought to eradicate an institution that gave Mississippians significant power over
their social and economic lives. While some voiced their belief in secession if a
Republican was elected president, and fire-eaters sought to make preparations for a
unified secession movement across the South eventually, the majority of this population
was not willing to advocate disunion. Instead, their eyes were set on what the future held,
watching the election of 1860 approach and waiting for the results of such an event
before further measures were taken.
Taken together, middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians blamed the
doctrines of the Republican Party in driving John Brown to raid Harper’s Ferry. A few
took into consideration the union meetings that occurred throughout the North in order to
establish peaceful relations towards the South. Others overlooked these demonstrations
and instead focused on the possibility of even more insurrections occurring, locally and
regionally. Middle-class citizens in Kentucky and Mississippi also took note of
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abolitionists within the state and sought to drive them out by any means necessary,
insisting the North do the same. Lastly, in order to protect their homes, property, and
values further, both groups saw to the reorganization of their state militias to keep
insurrections and invaders at bay, while, in Mississippi’s case, preparing for the
possibility of a Republican president.
Yet, while some groups continually pointed out the North’s actions as proof of
their alleged corruption and hostility, Union talk nonetheless abounded among middleclass citizens. White Kentuckians were the more outspoken among the two states,
asserting that the North should respect the South’s rights, especially to slavery. These
petitions were not for the sake of the South alone, however, as slavery was also a crucial
practice within the border state that provided Kentuckians’ with independency. Middleclass Kentuckians looked to continued compromise, also, and held onto their faith that
the justice system and the Constitution would prevail in the end, as other, more fanatical
measures were seen as more likely to threaten their cherished practices and ideals.
Likewise, some middle-class Mississippians also favored sustaining the Union
instead of harkening to the cries of local fire-eaters—an action that defies Olsen’s
argument that Mississippians took any political insult or threatening action as a personal
attack that needed to be violently confronted. Some individuals, however, reflected
Olsen’s findings and only desired the Union stay intact if their rights were respected, as
they saw the loss of their rights, and of slavery, as a loss of power over their lives and the
Constitution to the doctrines of a perceived abolitionist party. Mississippi, on the other
hand, also contained two factions of secessionist talk—as seen in the 1860 resolutions
passed by the legislature and the columnists of local newspapers. As one group took
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measures to push the South towards secession, the other believed that the Union could be
upheld but not under the rule of a party they viewed as pursuing the end of slavery and
the subjugation of the South. In short, secession was not just a means of protection, but a
greater means of sustaining white Mississippians’ power over their reputations, wealth,
and futures against perceived northern fanatics.
With that said, however, these examples also point to the continued faith in
politics due to their focus on the presidential election and maintaining the Union. While
citizens in both states abhorred the Republican Party’s approval of Helper’s book and
Seward’s “irrepressible conflict” doctrine, they nonetheless looked to voters and
politicians who were devoted to their communities to eliminate Republicans and see that
slavery, independency, and power was protected. While secessionist talk was present in
Mississippi, and was no doubt heard by the Kentuckians who spoke out against it,
middle-class citizens hoped to continue to rely on American politics to see to their
protection and their further expansion into the West. This faith continued well into 1860,
where delegates to national conventions gathered together to choose appropriate
candidates for the presidential campaign. Before and after these conventions, however,
middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians still exerted their fears over Republican rule
but also their continued hope in their candidates whom they entrusted with their state, and
the nation’s, future.
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- “A HORSE RACE”: THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL CONVENTIONS, APRIL-NOVEMBER 1860

Prior to 1860, while sectional tensions were formerly restrained through
compromise, the events of John Brown’s raid finally brought to reality a variety of
southern fears. In the 1850s, the white South witnessed the rise of a hostile political party
with an abolitionist wing whose only goal, they believed, was to eliminate their founding
ideals, and the privileges that came with them. These southerners viewed the Republican
Party’s platform as even more offensive and antagonistic when it hinted to an
“irrepressible conflict” where only war would decide whether the nation would be all free
or all slave. Yet, because no events had occurred that proved that these doctrines could or
would be carried out, southerners, although wary, perhaps did not believe these fears
would ever be realized. John Brown revealed that not only were these doctrines able to be
accomplished, but also that a following of able bodied men were capable of carrying
them out. In the eyes of most southern citizens, John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry
prophesied what the future might look like should a Republican president take control of
the country.
The year of 1860, therefore, has been described as a “horse race” by some
scholars, as presidential candidates scrambled to achieve a steady following before the
fate of the country could be decided in November. Citizens, additionally, saw 1860 as a
continued battle—a chance for disunion, continued compromise, or peace to be achieved
between the North and the South. Nevertheless, middle-class Mississippians and
Kentuckians used the election of 1860 to express what they valued most and what they
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hoped to sustain through select presidential nominees, such as economic prosperity,
slavery, southern rights, peace, and state equality with federal authority. In other words, it
was a chance to see that their valued independence and power remained unharmed by
electing a president who would see to their protection.
It could also be argued that the election was used by these states and individuals
to determine what their next steps would be in regard to their relationship with the nation
should an unfavorable candidate be elected. For instance, to white Kentuckians, the
eventual results of the election did not mean disunion. Instead, they saw a continued
struggle to keep the South from seceding and maintaining a peace where both sections
were satisfied despite having to accept the rule of an unfavorable president. To white
Mississippians, on other hand, the “dreaded catastrophe” of a Republican victory, equaled
some form of resistance, mainly secession, alongside her sister states of the South who
had seen every attempt at compromise fail and who viewed the Union as no longer the
Union their ancestors had fought to create.139
As a whole, however, the nation, as well as Kentucky and Mississippi, was torn
between multiple, sectional parties.140 While the national conventions occurring during
mid-1860 chose candidates successfully, including Republican nominee, Abraham
Lincoln, they also witnessed a severed Democratic party where discontented southern
delegates were unable to support Stephen A. Douglas who they saw as limiting slavery’s
movement into the West. As some believed that slavery should be protected indefinitely
within the territories and others were supportive of popular sovereignty, multiple factions

139
140

Olsen, Political Culture and Secession in Mississippi, 186.
Lowell H. Harrison, The Civil War in Kentucky (Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky,

1975), 4-5.

61

appeared within the party at the convention as a result. These groups ultimately formed
around select nominees from across the South, including James Guthrie, a native of
Kentucky, who desired complete protection of the South’s rights, Stephen A. Douglas
who denied federal protection of slavery, and John C. Breckenridge, another strong
southern rights candidate who refused to allow his name to be placed on the ballot as long
as Guthrie remained a candidate.141 At the moment when Douglas was seen as victorious,
delegates of eight southern states abandoned the convention and later carried out their
own convention in Baltimore, and this “Seceder’s Convention” eventually elected
Breckenridge as the Southern Democratic candidate. Meanwhile, Douglas was also
nominated as the candidate for the now northern portion of the Democratic Party.
Following these events, these three parties were joined by a more moderate group that did
not favor the outcomes of any one of the three candidates already selected. Consisting of
several members of the old Whig Party, and standing on the doctrine of compromise held
by Henry Clay, the Constitutional Union Party was formed to stand by the Constitution
and the Union as a whole. Their nomination of John Bell of Tennessee reflected their
platform, as he was said to be a man who would maintain the Union “at all costs.”142
Thus, both sections of the nation had to choose between four candidates whose
election determined what path the country would take in terms of western expansion,
slavery, and the continuation of sectional tensions. While each state reacted to this
election in its own way, Mississippi and Kentucky newspapers and letters during the
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campaign season reveal two states united in their efforts to prevent Lincoln from
becoming president. By favoring either Bell or Breckenridge, white, middle-class
Mississippians and Kentuckians also revealed that independence and power were still
highly valued and believed that their candidate of choice was best suited in protecting
these ideas by avoiding disunion, eliminating abolition, protecting southern rights,
political power, and equality, and defending slavery’s existence. In this way, they favored
patterns consistent with their reactions to the Harper’s Ferry raid—a deep hatred towards
Lincoln and the Republican Party, a need to preserve the Union that respected southern
rights which included slavery and the right to control its own affairs. While a small group
still advocated for the possibility of secession should the election prove deadly for the
South, middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians acted in one accord in regard to their
beliefs, but differed in whom they believed was best suited to protect these beliefs. It was
when the election results were produced in November 1860, however, that these two
states were pushed apart as war approached.
Once the national conventions began, middle-class Mississippians and
Kentuckians spent the period from March through May 1860 discussing a variety of
topics within their newspapers. A few examples illustrate Kentuckians and
Mississippians’ perspectives on the goals of the North and the Republican Party.
Accusing the northern delegates as acting like “enemies of the country,” Kentucky
delegates at Congress charged that the Republicans “must not be placed in power” for
they would “tear down the pillows of the temple of liberty” as well as see that slavery
was not extended into the western territories.143 Not only did northern delegates
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denounce these beliefs and accuse the South of “having its full share in the control of
Government” and “that no one was to blame for what the South complained of “except
the region’s own officers, but Republicans at the Chicago national convention also
rejected such accusations. Yet, they reassured that disunion and the “dogma that the
Constitution . . . carries slavery into any or all the Territories” was “political heresy” and
“revolutionary” at best. Hoping to stop slavery in its tracks, they sought to preserve “the
integrity of the Union, and the supremacy of the Constitution…against the conspiracy of
the leaders of the sectional party.” Significantly, such a platform was presented even in
Newport, Kentucky, where local delegates were being sought after who supported these
Republican “terms” and could be trusted to represent the public at the national
convention. 144 Those in Mississippi, however, showed little Republican support and
instead presented the party as “hostile to the rights of the South,” grounded in the
teachings of the “irrepressible conflict” that hoped to start a war between the North and
South, and whose rise to power necessitated dissolution.145 They even believed that if
such animosities, and the population of the North, continue to grow, the South would
“irretrievably be overthrown,” as the North would most likely abuse its power over the
government to subdue and destroy the South and its institutions.146
Additionally, several citizens later commented on the events at the Democratic
National Conventions, as well. The Louisville Daily Journal, in addition to providing
coverage of the convention at Charleston that hoped to see the Union maintained, also
contained several examples of newspapers across the North and South who commented
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on the “seceders” of the Charleston convention either favorably or unfavorably. Writers
to the Journal also focused on the struggle between delegates of the “Bolter’s
convention” at Baltimore to determine if the convention was, in fact, a State’s Rights
convention where delegates stood “for liberty first and the Union afterwards.”147
Elsewhere, citizens within Pontotoc, Mississippi, skipped the mundane details and openly
congratulated “the seceding States on the manly conduct of their delegates,” showing that
the South “intend[ed] to repel all further aggressions” and hinted that such actions were
“the initial steps to the formation of a Southern Confederacy.”148 Democrats of Warren
County, denouncing the “heresy of Popular Sovereignty,” also applauded southern
delegates “for their patriotic devotion to the South,” as the South would not accept
anything “less than an equivocal guaranty of protection to her citizens and their rights,
including slaves and all other property in the public territories.”149 In all, such actions by
the southern states at Charleston did not come as much of a surprise to Mississippi, as the
“Democracy” of the state in March had already created resolutions calling for the full
acknowledgment and protection of slavery and the continuation of equal rights among the
states—in short, the ability of the states to hold power over their own destinies and their
institutions.150 Should such guarantees not be presented and supported at the national
convention, Mississippi was determined to present another ticket for a more favorable
candidate.151 In the end, Mississippi, and several other delegates, carried out such a
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nomination and refused to participate in the Charleston convention, seeking instead to
form their own in Baltimore.
While middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians might not have had very
much to say in regard to the turnout at the national conventions, they had far more to say
about the candidates they now had to choose from. To Kentuckians and Mississippians,
the national conventions—while important—did not have the earth-shaking capabilities
as the approaching presidential election. To these middle-class citizens, it was this
election that determined the nation’s fate—whether the Union, slavery, their
independency, and their power would be preserved or if the South would lose faith and
resort to secession to protect itself. A search of thousands of Mississippi and Kentucky
newspaper articles for this period reveal that John Bell and John C. Breckenridge were
the candidates favored most among these citizens, as discussion on Douglas or Lincoln
often revealed middle-class citizens’ disgust of popular sovereignty, abolition,
subjugation, and coercion—factors that would harm Kentuckians’ independency and
Mississippians’ power over their lives and institutions.152 Ultimately, following the
conclusion of the national conventions, Bell and Breckenridge supporters in both
Mississippi and Kentucky discussed why they chose their particular candidate, while also
expressing why opposing candidates were unfavorable and oftentimes dangerous. In
doing so, these two states showed that they were similar in what they valued, including
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slavery, their rights, the South, and the Union, but differed in who they believed would
best defend these same values.153
Bell Supporters
Tennessee native, John Bell, had been active in politics since the 1830s, having
not only been a member of the former Whig Party, but also having served in the House of
Representatives and Senate. Having owned slaves himself, he won favor with citizens in
both the North and South by vowing to eliminate the slave question from politics and
keep the peace between the two sections, and he was especially popular among his fellow
moderates in the planter class. Thus, he was an ideal candidate for the Constitutional
Union Party and most border state citizens.154 Yet, how middle-class Mississippians and
Kentuckians expressed their support for Bell reveal what policies they cherished and why
Bell was seen as suitable for protecting their local and national interests. While some
Mississippi and Kentucky Bell supporters expressed their support for the Union and the
protection of slavery, other groups instead chose to express their favor for him by
portraying Breckenridge as a secessionist who they believed would plunge the nation into
disunion or see to it that slavery was not protected in the western territories.
Similar to the previous study into John Brown’s raid, middle-class Mississippians
continued to show unionist sentiments. Prior to Bell’s nomination, Hinds County Gazette
writers blamed the delegates of the Republican and Democratic parties for “agitating the
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country by their reciprocal assaults” and who aimed for a “sectional struggle far
exceeding in violence . . . the result of which may be disastrous to the country.” 155
Furthermore, Democrats’ actions, specifically those committed at the Charleston
Convention, had left “evidence of a . . . cold-blooded, deliberate, heartless conspiracy to
break up the Union” upon the election of a Republican president.156 Nevertheless, these
writers, while exposing these truths, described the Constitutional Union Party’s unionism
through its desire to remove the subject of slavery from politics, maintaining commitment
to the fugitive slave law, and “[teaching] reconciliation, fraternity, and forbearance, as the
great national charities by which the Union is ever preserved.”157 Attracted to such
declarations, many Mississippians fell in line behind this party, advocating for its support
and reiterating what it could accomplish for the nation. Rankin, Amite, and Claiborne
County citizens held their own meetings to express their devotion to the Union. Claiborne
County citizens specifically were “opposed to the extremists of the South and
Republicans of the North,” sought to banish “the discussion of slavery . . . from churches,
the hustings, and the capitol,” and favored the coming together of the conservative men
of the nation to “present to the people a Presidential ticket devoted to the general interests
of [the] common country.”158 A writer to the Salem Gazette even boasted of “the
increased strenth of Union candidates in the Southern States” but hinted that it would
only work in the Republicans’ favor.159
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Other citizens, however, spoke more specifically of their support for Bell as
president, focusing on what they saw as his soundness on the slavery issue and his plans
for maintaining the Union. Editors in Lexington, Mississippi, believed “that the only
means of preventing the election of Lincoln [was] by a union of the South upon Bell and
Everett, the only true national ticket” and far more favorable than the squatter sovereignty
doctrines of both Douglas and Breckenridge.160 Those in Richland, Mississippi,
entertained a supporter of the Constitutional Union Party who assured the citizens that
Bell was “sound as a dollar on the slavery question,” having owned thousands of dollars
in slave property and voting against the Lecompton Constitution.161 A discussion in
Brookhaven also pointed to Bell and Everett as “noble statesmen” who “had defended
their country’s rights so long” and “should command the support of all patriots.”162 The
Weekly Mississippian writers later reported that Vicksburg declared “with confidence”
that Bell and Everett were “free from the taint of sectionalism” and “stood on the
platform which ensur[ed] the perfect equality of the states, and the constitutional rights of
all the people.” These citizens went on to inform the public that they had gathered
trustworthy information that Bell would carry the state in November and insisted Union
clubs be established in every county.163 In sum, one citizen embodied the visions of all
Bell supporters in the state, believing that “if [Mississippians] would preserve the Union
and protect the rights and interests of all sections of [the] common country,” they should
vote for the only “safe, sound, and reliable” ticket under Bell and Everett.164
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Those in Kentucky also expressed their favor of Bell through an emphasis on
unionism. One writer in the Louisville Daily Journal insisted that Kentuckians must be
“as one for the Union,” “crushing now and forever the foul heresies which define the old
parties” by electing Bell and Everett to the presidency and the vice presidency. Calling on
men of all ages, the writer additionally called on women to stand by their men and
reassure them that Bell’s success would produce “peaceful homes and happy hearthstones,” while bringing an end to fanaticism.165 In hoping to prevent the election of
Lincoln by rallying support from northern states like New York and Maine, other
Kentuckians ensured that “there would be no Disunion if Bell and Everett were elected,”
as Lincoln’s election would only give secessionists in the South a chance to see secession
achieved.166 An unknown writer even commented that the sectional parties were in favor
of Bell winning if they could not, not only because they could not stand seeing another
sectional party gaining victory, but also because Bell and Everett had “established a
broad, liberal, national platform,” and would prove to be the nation’s “sustainers and
champions” in the end.167 To middle-class Kentuckians, “the names of Bell and Everett
[had] become towers of strength,”—“an available middle ground” that would lead to an
end to sectional tensions while “peace [would] be expected once more to smile over a
distracted and divided country.”168
Yet, while middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians expressed their belief in
Bell’s ability to save the union and rights that included slavery, while keeping secession
at bay, these supporters also took it upon themselves to reveal that the alternative—
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Breckenridge—was unacceptable and would lead to chaos upon his election. To
Mississippi voters, what they feared most were the rumors and evidences that
Breckenridge was supportive of “squatter sovereignty.” One of the reasons many
Southern Democrats and middle-class Mississippians refused to support Douglas was due
to his belief in popular sovereignty and that Congress should not offer protection to
slavery, which would hinder the rights Mississippians’ mentioned in earlier sources, as
well as their honor and wealth. The Vicksburg Whig, a leading union organ, not only
pointed out that Breckenridge’s party members were all disunionists, but more
importantly presented evidence of Breckenridge stating that individuals had “the full
right to establish or prohibit slavery” and that he was not connected to a party “that [had]
for its object the extension of slavery.”169 Furthermore, he looked “with but little favor
upon the true doctrine of protection of slavery in the territories by Congress,” and
suggested resolutions within Kentucky that made slavery “wholly local,” that “any
legislation on the subject of slavery . . . was not within the power of Congress,” and that
“people of the territories [were] free to say for themselves whether they should have
slavery or not.”170
Middle-class Kentuckians, on the other hand, were not so much concerned with
Breckenridge’s supposed endorsement of popular sovereignty as they were of stopping
his and the more radical-wing of the Democratic Party’s disunionist schemes. Some
simply believed that he was not for the Union, while others insisted he led a “military
169
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conspiracy”, whose “disunion party” was “hurrying the country into civil war” by
inciting states to purchase arms. This would plunge the nation into a “seven years’ war”
should the African slave trade not be reopened and their demands met. Others saw
Breckenridge and the Democratic Party as “secretly desir[ing] the success of Lincoln and
Hamlin, from the belief that it would enable them to bring about the dissolution of the
Union.”171 Evidence gathered by Kentuckians also fed these same rumors that
Breckenridge supporters were intentionally voting for Lincoln “to get [him] elected and
then dissolve the Union.”172 In short, some Kentuckians believed that “every vote for
Breckenridge . . . is in its practical effect a vote for disunion and civil war,” a scenario
that would negatively affect the economic and social practices that gave middle-class
Kentuckians depended on.173
Thus, Bell supporters in both Mississippi and Kentucky supported unionism, but a
union that protected slavery. Voters were attracted to Bell’s nationalist policies and his
vow to see that the Union was preserved and brought at once to peace. Moreover, some
middle-class Mississippians were increasingly attracted to his intentions of keeping the
slavery question out of politics while simultaneously keeping it and their rights protected,
an act that would also see to their continued power in society and their personal lives.
Some middle-class Kentuckians, while certainly not uncaring when it came to slavery’s
future, were far more focused on electing a candidate that they believed would keep the
Union in one piece while avoiding secession, something they could not say for the other
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candidates who either threatened slavery and citizens’ independency or desired to see the
Union dissolved.
Such findings not only add to the existing historiography concerning the months
prior to the election of 1860, which often lack in detail concerning each state’s stance on
presidential candidates, but also support Christopher Olsen’s findings which argue that,
for some Kentuckians, Bell was the “national hope” for compromise and preventing
secession. On the other hand, Mississippians support for Bell hinted at their “lukewarm
unionism”—a unionism that fell in line with the beliefs of figures such as Jefferson Davis
and wealthy “Northern-oriented” planters along the Mississippi River. These individuals
were tied to the northeast through familial and economic ties and believed in the right of
secession, but did not see a reason for it and sought compromise within the Union to save
the nation and their financial interests. Nevertheless, it was seen that such unionism fell
short as secession approached and as all compromise efforts failed.174 Such an argument
will be explored in a later chapter, but over all, these sources have shown that Bell
supporters desired a strong, continuous Union that included protection of slavery, their
rights to it, and an end to secessionism. Such desires, they believed, could only be
accomplished through their candidate, resulting in the preservation of ideas each state
valued the most. Contrarily, Breckenridge supporters found other, more promising
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benefits in their choice, while also pointing out what they believed as the deadly
consequences of a Bell victory.
Breckenridge Supporters
Even though some middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians were attracted to
Bell’s devotion to the Union, others were drawn to native Kentuckian, John C.
Breckenridge, who stood for an amorphous concept that most citizens had been
advocating for some time—southern rights, or the belief that southerners held in their
right to own slaves and to have the power to govern their own state’s destiny, decisions,
and slave-holder interests.175 Having studied law for many years and representing the
U.S. in the Mexican War, Breckenridge had served as a southern rights Democrat for
many years in the Kentucky State Legislature and in Congress. Although he did not own
slaves at the time of the election, both states did not question his stance on slavery and
southern rights; however, what citizens did question was his loyalty to the Union.176 As
already noted, Bell supporters glanced at Breckenridge’s party members and his past
statements concerning particular legislation to prove that he led a secessionist party, but
also leaned towards supporting Douglas’s popular sovereignty, as well. Despite these
particular accusations, however, Breckenridge fought to reveal that he was, in fact, for
keeping the Union together while also fighting for the South’s rights.177 For some middleclass Mississippians and Kentuckians, these rumors of Breckenridge supporting secession
fell on deaf ears, and they instead expressed their intentions of voting for Breckenridge,
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as he seemed far more suitable in protecting southerners’ rights than a John Bell, who
they believed would see to slavery’s end.
Passing through several southern states, including Mississippi, a gentleman took
note of “the enthusiasm for Breckenridge and [his running mate] Lane” that “unbounded”
within these areas. “Battling for the great cause of the Democracy,” the people were said
to have “gathered by the thousands at the little towns” to listen to speeches and attend the
poles.178 White Mississippians, then, rallied support for Breckenridge across the state,
believing him to be “a Union man”—“a defender of the institution of slavery” who
opposed emancipationists and stood “with and for the South upon every question
affecting her rights and honor.”179 More locally, Sardis and Oktibbeha “resolv[ed] to have
a National Democratic Rally and Barbecue,” advocating not solely for Breckenridge and
Lane, but also “Southern Rights and State Equality,” while Neshoba County, in addition
to Clinton and Clark counties, rejoiced at their support for Breckenridge and laid out
resolutions that supported the seceding delegates and all they stood for at the national
convention.180 Marshall County citizens also ratified Breckenridge and supported the
Democratic delegates’ actions, vowing to get Breckenridge elected at all costs.181 Lastly,
citizens of Raleigh, Mississippi, were “aroused by a shout, loud, long, and vociferous”
from a large company that traveled down the road under a “Beautiful Flag . . . with the
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names Breckenridge and Lane inscribed thereon in beautiful letters” as electors were
escorted into town to discuss the candidates and their platforms in detail.182
Nonetheless, while some middle-class Mississippians showed their support for
Breckenridge by pointing to his backing of slavery and subsequently the South’s rights,
other citizens presented evidence of what they saw as Bell’s abolitionism and how he was
no different than Lincoln in order to increase Breckenridge’s popularity. Oftentimes,
citizens cited Bell’s past speeches to prove that he believed Congress had the power to
abolish slavery in the territories. For example, in 1850 and 1858, Bell, speaking
specifically on slavery’s abolition, stated that “it was a desirable object, if it could be
done on safe principles, to remove that apple of discord between the North and the
South.”183 Voters noticed that Bell had also “received abolition petitions” in the early
1850s, while citizens in Trenton were seen abandoning their support for the candidate for
his “obnoxious sentiments on the slavery question” and doctrines that “submitt[ed] and
encourag[ed] northern aggression” while pushing the nation even closer to disunion.184
Mississippians also pointed to Edward Everett, who was rumored to be an “advocate for
negro equality” and spoke on the “advantages of . . . immediate emancipation,” as well as
other individuals in the Constitutional Union Party who believed that “negroes [were]
citizens of the United States” and “who [stood] opposed to the South and her
constitutional rights.”185
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In sum, even though these Mississippians were vocal in their support for
Breckenridge as a man who they saw as promoting southern rights, he was also a
candidate that did not advocate for slavery’s disappearance. To these citizens, who
glanced at John Bell’s past actions in Tennessee and in the walls of Congress, Bell was
simply another Lincoln who would either see slavery abolished, push the nation into
disunion, and bring harm middle-class Mississippians’ power, wealth, and futures. These
beliefs were mirrored by choice voters in Kentucky who readily agreed that Breckenridge
was far more suitable for the presidency than Bell and Everett or Douglas.
Declared the “democracy’s champion, Kentucky’s favorite” and “the nation’s
pride,” multiple cities and counties across Kentucky endeavored to show their support for
Breckenridge locally.186 Voters believed that Breckenridge’s party was the only one that
protected slavery, while openly offering “an overzealous devotion to the rights of the
South and the States.187 In lamenting, and sometimes rejoicing, over the actions of the
seceding delegates at Charleston, as well as denouncing Douglas’s “unjust and pernicious
Squatter Sovereignty doctrines,” Kenton, Boone, and Pendleton County threw their
support behind Breckenridge, “a sound National Democrat,” (should Guthrie not be
nominated) believing that “the South [had] clear constitutional rights” in regard to
slavery.188 Additionally, standing under a platform that embodied the Constitution itself
which secured “equal rights to all,” Lyon County asserted that Breckenridge would be
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“the harbinger of a new era of peace and quietude to the nation.”189 Likewise, delegates
from the “First Appellate District of Kentucky”—thirty-one counties in total
supposedly—confirmed their support for Breckenridge’s nomination, while Mason
County, Madison County, and Georgetown, Kentucky, insisted that anyone who valued
“the safety of the South, and the continuance of Democratic rule” should vote for
Breckenridge and Lane.190 Other middle-class Kentuckians believed that to preserve the
Union, prevent Lincoln’s election which would “reduce fifteen sovereign states of the
confederation to the level of conquered provinces,” and maintain “equality in the Union,”
citizens must vote for Breckenridge.191
Ultimately, these middle-class Kentuckians were drawn to Breckenridge’s strong
support for the white South, its rights to practices that they believed the North was trying
to stifle, and preserving the Union. Yet, while voicing their favor for Breckenridge, other
Kentuckians briefly pointed out, in passing, their disinterest of Douglas, but more
intensely, their fear of Bell. Those in Pendleton County added that Douglas’s efforts to
win their support were in vain, as they could not back such “radical” and
“unconstitutional doctrines in regard to Popular Sovereignty in the Territories,” while the
Kenton County Democrat writers believed that Douglas could not carry the state and
sought to get Breckenridge elected.192 Bath County simply accused Douglas of “trickery”
and “heresy” within the Democratic Party, while the Maysville Express of Mason County
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pointed to Douglas and his followers as being “co-fanatics of the Black Republicans.”193
Kenton and Boone Counties saw his doctrine as “at war with the rights of one section of
the republic,” while Douglas himself was “in every respect obnoxious to the South.”194 In
the end, it was Douglas’s popular sovereignty doctrines that limited his success among
Kentucky voters.
More commonly, however, Breckenridge supporters in Kentucky debated John
Bell’s inadequacy as president by discussing his views on subjects like slavery and
disunion. Some middle-class citizens questioned Bell and his stance on slavery, asking if
he “be a suitable person to be placed at the head of this great nation, half of which enjoy
the institution of slavery.” 195 As if hoping to answer the questions, others printed records
of Bell’s time in Congress, revealing where he had supposedly cast votes with the
Republicans, “materially affecting the institution of slavery.” Additionally, while voicing
that some were “gloriously disappointed” in Bell’s nomination, Kentuckians also pointed
to his running mate, Edward Everett, “an anti-slavery man” who “never let an occasion
pass in which” to “thrust at the South and Southern men.” Rumors were also presented of
Everett supposedly supporting a “free Kansas” in the past and admitting in 1839 that
Congress had the power to abolish slavery, that the slave trade should not be permitted
between the states, and that no new states should be permitted to join the Union with
slavery—confessions, they believed, Everett had yet to deny in 1860.196 Elsewhere, some
witnessed how split the votes were between the four candidates and urged Kentuckians to
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restrain themselves from voting for Bell, as it would “directly [weaken] Breckenridge,
and indirectly [help] Lincoln” in seeing to the South’s subjugation.197 Paducah, speaking
directly to its German residents, asked if they were “willing to fall into line with the
Know-Nothing Party” and elect a man who would “be unwilling to concede to them the
right of suffrage.198 In short, one writer in Kentucky stated that Douglas and Bell were
“not worthy of consideration” as they did not have the slightest chance of winning, not
just because of their platforms, but because votes for either man would “be giving greater
chances for Lincoln.” Thus, in these middle-class Kentuckians’ eyes, Breckenridge was
the only candidate who had the nerve to rebuke abolitionism, “administer the
Government purely and justly,” and subsequently keep their independence intact.199
Therefore, Breckenridge supporters in both Mississippi and Kentucky shared
close similarities in 1860. Throughout these sources, voters continually voiced their
desires to elect an individual who they believed would protect the white South’s rights
and equality, which consisted of their ability to govern their own decisions and
institutions, such as slavery—an institution that made middle-class Mississippians and
Kentuckians’ power and independency possible. Disregarding rumors that Breckenridge
was a disunionist, his supporters emphasized his devotion to the South, both past and
present, as well as to the institution of slavery. On the other hand, middle-class
Mississippians and Kentuckians hoped to reiterate to the rest of the states’ residents that
choosing Bell would end only in disaster. To these individuals, by voting for such a
candidate, and even for Douglas, they were seeing to the end of slavery, disunion, and the
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South’s journey to servitude to the northern states and the Republican Party by the
elimination of their rights. Ultimately, voting for either candidate was not only seeing to
the end of their rights and practices, but also their independency and power. In addition to
this, however, when they were not using Bell or Douglas as examples of these frightening
scenarios, they were explaining in detail what might happen should Lincoln be elected.
The Consequences of Lincoln’s Election
Already both states were aware of the consequences of having more than two
candidates running for the presidency. With the votes split so drastically, middle-class
Mississippians and Kentuckians feared that if white southerners did not unite under a
single candidate—maybe even two—then they paved the way for Lincoln’s election.200
Simultaneously, however, they were also made aware of what they believed the
consequences of his election would be for the nation, and some citizens were making
preparations to face such an event. In Mississippi, Lincoln was seen as “the author of
antagonism” and “the Great Agitator,” who in joining the abolitionists “signalized the
narrowness of his views, and his opposition to the South, by voting for every scheme
which had for its object the degradation of the South, for her rightful position of equality
in the Union”—actions middle-class Mississippians saw as only intensifying upon his
election. In addition, he was seen as a firm supporter of the “irrepressible doctrine,”
believing that the nation would either become all slave or all free, led a party that
“consist[ed] of men who regar[ed] slavery as a curse and a crime,” and hoped to
“revolutionize the Government” alongside his party members.201 A writer in the Weekly

200

Finck, Divided Loyalties, 21-29.
Semi-Weekly Mississippian, 19 June 1860; Semi-Weekly Mississippian, 29 May 1860; Weekly
Mississippian, 7 November 1860.
201

81

Mississippian, presenting a piece written by Republican member, Daniel E. Somes,
emphasized further what this party would accomplish upon its rise to power. In addition
to the abolishment of slavery in the District of Columbia, they believed that Lincoln and
the Republicans would enact the “ultimate emancipation of the Slave States by the
introduction of free speech and free press” while establishing “a new civilization in the
South” despite the region’s violent resistance.202
In believing of how harmful a Republican president would be, citizens exclusively
voiced their favor of secession if Lincoln were elected, one speaker insisting that
Lincoln’s victory would “make secession a necessity.”203 Citizens of Lowndes County,
Mississippi, agreed, believing that a Republican president would be “hostile to political
equality and security of the Southern States,” and “an act so offensive and aggressive as
to justify” disunion.204 A Neshoba County election banner promoted “Death rather than
submission to a Black Republican government,” while another citizen exclaimed that
secession, a “firm resolve, one bold and manly move,” would preserve Mississippi’s
honor and a Mississippian’s manliness in the wake of a Republican takeover.205 To
middle-class Mississippians, and even to some more moderate followers of Bell,
Lincoln’s election would “be an affront to their honor and manly equality,” whereas
secession was seen as a true expression of manliness—a method that should certainly be
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used should Breckenridge not win and all compromise fail.206 Yet, beyond talk, other
Mississippi counties were taking more active measures to prepare for the future of the
state.
While newspapers discussed the election in depth in 1860, military action was
seen throughout Mississippi as the event approached. Historians have reported that
Governor John Jones Pettus had kept a close watch of military matters by summoning
generals and captains to a conference in Jackson. This additionally caused a widespread
movement of buffering the state’s defenses, and several letters to the governor attest to
these actions.207 Citizens across Mississippi wrote to Governor Pettus about local
company formations and obtaining arms, including L.C. Moore of Vicksburg who desired
the governor supply a volunteer company with about seventy-five “rifle muskets” in
Vicksburg.208 J.G. Hamer of Salem, Mississippi later reminded the governor that he had
“executed a Bond of thirty five hundred dollars” to him for the purchase of forty-two
cavalry arms for his company and was sorely disappointed that his men had to drill
without them.209 In order to ease the “anxiety and impatience” of his men waiting for
arms, Thomas W. Harris of Holly Springs requested a reply to his letter concerning his
earlier request for arms, so as to “preserve and increase the strength of my . . . company
and the volunteers corps of the State.”210 Others, like T.A. Graves, desired copies of the
“regulations and by laws which [they were] to be governed by—also what kind of arms
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[they were] supposed to get” in order to form an appropriate company in Hazlehurst,
Mississippi.211 Lastly, J.M. Thomson of Houston, Mississippi, after hearing word that
Lincoln may win the election, asked Governor Pettus to deliver a “minnie-rifle” that
could be used against “the Black Republicans and the Irrepressible Conflict gentry” of
the North.212
Whether these company formations were constructed based on the fear of
Lincoln’s elections is unknown, however. Past historians have noted the continuance of
paranoia around possible slave insurrections enacted by outsiders during this time.
Mississippi newspapers often pointed out suspicious outsiders in the state, and one
famous account of a slave insurrection was viewed in the Semi-Weekly Mississippian in
Plattsburg, Mississippi. Several slaves and one traveler from the North were arrested after
confessing to the plot, but historians have argued that this was the exception. Although
rumors abounded, these revolts were rarely grounded in actual fact; nonetheless,
vigilance committees were created readily during 1860 to monitor slaves and visitors, so
it is possible that these volunteer companies were seen as a method to dissuade slave
revolts.213 Even so, it is important to note that counties throughout Mississippi were
preparing themselves militarily in 1860 and prior to the election.214

211

T.A. Graves to John J. Pettus, 22 October 1860, Box 930, Folder 8, Item 25, State Government
Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
212
J.M. Thomson to John J. Pettus, 16 August 1860, Box 930, Folder 7, Item 6, State Government
Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History. For more examples of company formations, see
Et al. to John J. Pettus, 17 September 1860, Box 930, Folder 8, Item 2, State Government Records,
Mississippi Department of Archives and History; L.B. Walker to John J. Pettus, 18 September 1860, Box
930, Folder 8, Item 5, State Government Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History; T.A.
Graves to John J. Pettus, 21 September 1860, Box 930, Folder 8, Item 9, State Government Records,
Mississippi Department of Archives and History; Thomas W. Harris to John J. Pettus, 8 October 1860, Box
930, Folder 8, Item 18, State Government Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
213
Barney, The Secessionist Impulse, 163-180; Semi-Weekly Mississippian, 9 October 1860.
214
For more information concerning militia formation in Mississippi, see Barney, The Secessionist
Impulse, 112-117. In addition to having $150,000 to buy arms and establish volunteer companies, Barney

84

Elsewhere, evidence within local newspapers and letters does not show the
Bluegrass State forming companies or fighting local slave insurrections. While these
events may have been occurring and were simply not reported, it seems middle-class
Kentuckians did not see the need for such military formations or did not see war
approaching and believed that the Union could still be saved. Newspapers in Kentucky
did, however, cover slave insurrections in other states like Arkansas, Texas, and
Mississippi. While not stating their personal thoughts on these particular issues and
events, Kentuckians also do not indicate that they were fearful of possible slave
revolts.215
Middle-class Kentuckians, however, did spend their time voicing their fears on
what Lincoln’s election might produce, such as secession in the South or efforts made by
the North to coerce the South back into the Union through force, resulting in civil war.
On the other hand, some citizens believed that if secession did not occur, an “Abolition
Congress” would slowly begin to “pass one act to another till all its present purposes
were accomplished” and slavery was eliminated with the aid of “‘conservative’ defenders
of Lincoln,” and southern abolitionists who had previously been kept silent.216 They also
sought to express “Disunion doctrines” of the South within their newspapers, such as
those from Mr. Toombs of Georgia, who stated that Lincoln’s election “would be the last
feather” on his back, and those in Alabama, who vowed to rise up against the United
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States government as it enforced unfavorable laws upon the South, “until civil war, with
all its horrible butcheries, envelopes the land in a shroud of blood and carnage.217
Ultimately, most middle-class Kentuckians feared what the southern states would
do in the end, hoping they would not resort to secession and the North would not use
force against the South. Nevertheless, a few citizens voiced that they would follow the
South into disunion if the “wolves” of the North came knocking at their doors. Humphrey
Marshall, a former Kentucky congressman, stated that he would rather leave the state
than witness the “surrender and sacrifice of the constitutional rights of [his] people” if the
Republicans won.218 Another Kentuckian, as the election drew closer, sorrowfully
believed that “nothing but a fight [would] save the South.” “The sooner the better,” he
later stated, but these few examples of secessionist talk in the state did not dominate large
groups of Kentuckians.219 In fact, one visitor to Kentucky “discovered . . . no evidence of
Southern radicalism among any group of Kentuckians” and believed that secession would
not be accepted if Lincoln was elected.220 While these observations prove interesting,
future evidence will prove that “Southern radicalism” certainly existed in Kentucky, but
was simply waiting for the right moment to surface.
While their views of what would happen if Lincoln was elected were slightly
different, in viewing middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians’ fears of his election,
it can be determined that both groups shared beliefs that Lincoln was not a favorable
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president and whose election would only lead to intensified animosities between the
sections, if not disunion. Both middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians feared how
Lincoln’s election would affect slavery, some believing that he would enact the
immediate abolition of the practice throughout the country while simultaneously
threatening the South with coercion and slave insurrections, produced not only by
Lincoln’s victory, but also slavery’s end. Specifically, in Mississippi, a Republican
victory not only meant a possible loss of rights and equality, but also denoted a loss of
local control. For instance, nominees had always depended on southern votes to win
elections in the past, yet the Republican Party in 1860 simply needed to win the electoral
vote of the North to claim victory, disregarding the South’s votes entirely. Thus, to the
majority of middle-class Mississippians, the election of Lincoln and the possible abolition
of slavery meant a loss of power over their own decisions, interests, the Union, and
liberty within the nation—a perceived loss that would drive them into secession as a form
of protection and control, which will be explored in detail later.221
Elsewhere, middle-class Kentuckians feared for the nation as a whole, hoping that
the South would act with reason and not secede, while also hoping that a Republican
would not be elected or the party’s doctrines not be as violent as they were often
portrayed. To most Kentuckians, secession meant that slavery, and the slave laws, would
become nonexistent and that an imminent civil war would occur between the sections
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with Kentucky caught in the middle.222 Some, however, were determined to secede
themselves should Lincoln prove victorious, sharing the same views as middle-class
Mississippians who found Lincoln’s presidency unacceptable and who believed that
slavery, their rights, and possibly their independency were better protected in their own
confederacy. Nonetheless, despite conflicting views among its own people concerning
Kentucky’s fate, middle-class Kentuckians as a whole agreed with middle-class
Mississippians’ belief that Lincoln’s election would lead to complications, and the
Bluegrass State watched with anticipation as November drew even closer.
Ultimately, as the national conventions for both the Republican and the
Democratic Parties came to a close, Mississippi and Kentucky, and their middle-class
citizens, again showed just how similar they were by openly voicing what needed
protecting, even if they did not agree on the same presidential candidate. Not only did
their dislike of Lincoln continue, but it also produced a greater fear of his election,
especially as it became more of a reality with the election split between four candidates.
Additionally, despite splitting in regard to who they believed was better suited as
president and why, both middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians nonetheless shared
a continued devotion to southern rights, which involved slavery’s protection, by
preventing the enactment of popular sovereignty and abolition—harmful practices they
believed would not just affect their states’ institutions and futures, but also their citizens’
valued independency and power. They also further emphasized slavery’s importance by
pointing out flaws in other candidates, such as Bell, who was rumored to have supported
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legislation that stood against slavery, or Douglas, who left slavery without federal
protection. Furthermore, hints of unionism could still be seen in Mississippi and
especially in Kentucky, as Bell and Breckenridge supporters put their faith in men they
believed would hold the nation together and bring peace by protecting slavery and
southern rights, while simultaneously speaking out against opposing candidates who
might be supporting disunion. In all, however, neither state pushed solely for the nation’s
dissolution. In fact, they chose separate candidates whom they believed protected the
Union, promoted peace, protected southern rights, and kept slavery as an active practice.
These findings add to the current historiography surrounding the 1860 campaign
season within Mississippi and Kentucky. Some historians have emphasized the secession
of delegates at the Charleston Convention, but have failed to fully describe what was
happening in border and southern states during the presidential campaign. When this
period is discussed, it is often confined to presidential candidates or local politicians,
such as their campaign speeches, travels, and responses to difficult topics like slavery. In
more recent studies, specifically when discussing particular states, this event is briefly
summarized before moving on to the election’s results and the response to it or is
grouped within studies involving other states, which only leads to overshadowing how
individual states uniquely reacted to the election campaign. These studies are important,
as they fully encompass what these politicians stood for and hoped to accomplish and
what ultimately occurred as the election ended. Yet, studying middle-class citizens’
thoughts and opinions during this period is also crucial, especially in states like Kentucky
and Mississippi, as it emphasizes just why specific candidates were favored among
citizens, what policies they valued most, and what they hoped the future would look like
89

should their candidate become president. Such an emphasis also reveals that while they
differed on which candidate they supported, the majority of middle-class Mississippians
and Kentuckians were vastly similar in regard to their support for the Union, but to some,
a Union that protected southern rights and slavery. This chapter, thus, hopes to fill in the
gaps and adds to previous studies, offering in detail who middle-class Mississippians and
Kentuckians favored the most for president, why, what they valued, and what they hoped
to protect or sustain as a nation and as a state.
Come November, and as the election drew to a close and both states cast their
votes, Bell dominated Kentucky, while Breckenridge claimed Mississippi. According to
historians, Constitutional Unionists had the greatest advantage in the Bluegrass State
because of their ties to Henry Clay and their emphasis on slavery’s protection within the
Union. “That heritage, along with a general public understanding that secession created a
real threat of civil war,” captured Kentuckians who preferred preservation and
compromise over secession, war, and the loss of slavery.223 While secessionist talk
existed, though it was not the dominate force at the time, middle-class Kentuckians
revealed that they neither identified themselves as completely southern, nor entirely
American, as in their eyes either identity consisted of a radicalism that threatened
Kentuckians’ independency with abolition, war, and/or economic ruin. Instead, as
“proslavery Unionists” favoring a Union that kept slavery in a peaceful manner, they cast
themselves as solely “Kentuckian,” seeking a platform that protected their independency
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and more specifically, slavery and their economic connections between both sections of
the state. In this case, supporting Bell and the Constitutional Union Party offered that
assurance.224
As for Mississippi, Breckenridge’s victory revealed the state’s ultimate goal of
seeing that the South was equally represented within the nation by a man who had proven
his devotion to the South and slavery’s protection. Middle-class Mississippians, then,
were swayed once more by their strong antipartyism, choosing a strong, pro-southern
rights candidate who best suited their interests and protected their power over slavery and
the state’s future even if he did not represent the Democratic Party. While some
historians have contended that Mississippi’s choice for Breckenridge revealed their
strong support for secession, and that even Bell supporters, later known as the
cooperationist faction, favored secession in some form should the North continue to
neglect the South’s rights, such findings will be addressed in this study later and are
beyond the scope of this current chapter.225 Instead, Breckenridge’s victory simply
revealed what was most important to the state—slavery’s ultimate preservation, the
ability to control a state’s own decisions and future, and protecting the South from
subjugation to the North, resulting in their ultimate goal of maintaining power.
Despite their similarities, and despite both states’ faith and hope that the election
of 1860 would stave off secession and produce a president who was devoted to southern
rights and slavery, these hopes faded rapidly. In discovering that Lincoln had won the
presidency, South Carolina began its move to leave the Union permanently. Soon after,
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Mississippi followed in the Palmetto State’s footsteps, but the Bluegrass State hesitated,
scrambling to find solutions not only to keep the Union intact, but also to protect itself.
From November 1860 to the end of July 1861, several events occurred, and middle-class
Mississippians and Kentuckians, having once acted in unison in their beliefs since John
Brown’s Raid, grew vastly different. It would be these citizens, writing to their governors
and local newspapers, who voiced the reasons why Mississippi seceded and Kentucky
remained neutral, revealing just how their identities and founding ideas affected those
same decisions.
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– “WE MUST HAVE PROTECTION”: KENTUCKY, MISSISSIPPI,
AND THE SECESSION CRISIS, DECEMBER 1860-JULY 1861

On May 28, 1861, a young Maysville, Kentucky, citizen wrote to Governor
Beriah Magoffin, alerting him of a very important matter, while simultaneously calling
on his aid. This Kentuckian informed Magoffin that “the youths” of Maysville had
organized themselves into a company, and the captain requested a sword and belt be sent
to him immediately. While the formation of companies such as this was not a unique
matter during 1861, the reason these Maysville citizens organized is what is most telling
of what was occurring in the state following Lincoln’s election. The writer stated that the
main reason for this company’s formation was “for the protection of the Neutrality of our
state.”226 Elsewhere, the citizens of DeSoto County, Mississippi, met to discuss what had
transpired in the nation following the 1860 presidential election. These Mississippians
vowed to cast aside all differences in opinion in order to “arrest the progress of
abolitionism” and agreed that there seemed to be no assurance that their rights would be
respected under Lincoln. Therefore, they hoped to “sustain and protect these rights by
timely and manly resistance” and declared their belief in the right of a state to sever its
ties with the Union in order to keep those rights.227 Such letters not only capture the
mood in each state during the secession crisis, but they also represent the thoughts and
feelings of most middle-class white Kentuckians and Mississippians.
226

H. M. Pearce to Beriah Magoffin, 28 May 1861, Office of the Governor, Beriah Magoffin:
Governor's Official Correspondence File, Military Correspondence, 1859-1862, MG5-107 to MG5-108,
Kentucky Department for Libraries and Archives, Frankfort, KY. Accessed via the Civil War Governors of
Kentucky Digital Documentary Edition, discovery.civilwargovernors.org/document/KYR-0001-019-0057,
(accessed November 5, 2019).
227
Weekly Mississippian, 12 December 1860.

93

In addition to a focus on protecting themselves from hostile entities in these
specific examples, other letters to and from the governors’ desks of Kentucky and
Mississippi, as well as local newspapers, further shine a light onto the responses of white,
middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians following November 1860. In their efforts
to see that John Bell or John C. Breckenridge were elected, both states had scrambled to
explain to the public why their support should be in either candidate.228 Although hopeful
that other states would follow their lead, Kentucky and Mississippi were nonetheless met
with disappointment when the election results announced Lincoln’s success.
Immediately, the southern states began to push the South further towards
disunion. Several political leaders and local fire eaters attempted to convince the South
that Lincoln and other abolitionists had, in their eyes, the power to see an end to slavery
and the southerner’s way of life. They believed the South would be reduced to conquered
territory beneath the North, where white, southern men would be forced into slavery
under former slaves who would be free to ravish white women.229 As noted in previous
chapters, such fears reverberated throughout the southern states, including Kentucky and
Mississippi, yet in a movement “unprecedented in the annals of the American Republic,”
South Carolina took the lead and “opened the flood gates” by seceding in late December
1860. Coaxing other southern states to follow them, the Palmetto State believed that they
and “slavery [were] doomed within the Union” now that a Republican president had been
elected.230
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Kentucky and Mississippi did not turn a blind eye to South Carolina’s actions nor
the reasoning of fire eaters as they advocated for secession. Both states seemed appalled
by the Republican Party’s doctrines and the acts of abolitionists, like John Brown, prior
to the election, where teachings of slave emancipation and an “irrepressible conflict”
seemed to threaten white southerners’ right to carry their slaves into the West. In an
attempt to prevent abolitionism from growing in strength and to keep a Republican away
from the presidency, both states turned to America’s democratic system, which they
believed would succeed in protecting slavery and their rights to it in the end. Yet, despite
vigorous campaigns prior to November 1860, white Kentuckians and Mississippians saw
their efforts thwarted by a Republican victory. Suddenly, to these states, their ultimate
fears of losing not just slavery and their rights, but also their independency and power,
had come to fruition and all avenues of compromise, to some, seemed exhausted. Yet,
instead of acting in unison in their reactions as they had after John Brown’s raid in
October 1859 and during the presidential campaign of 1860, Kentucky and Mississippi
found themselves traveling down different paths as Lincoln was inaugurated. Both states
agreed that slavery and southern rights were important, but it was on how best to protect
them that they differed greatly. In the end, each state’s decision was ultimately affected
by their unique identities and founding ideas formed upon the state’s establishment,
which were grounded in a vibrant economy and their views on honor, white privilege,
slavery, community, and masculinity. Even though these decisions were solidified by the
summer of 1861, however, both states discovered that their troubles were far from over,
as not only did they anticipate open war outside of their borders, but sources also hint at a
struggle from within and among their own citizens.
95

Kentucky’s Response
After Lincoln’s election, Kentucky immediately made efforts to not only reassure
citizens of the state’s stance towards what appeared to be an impending crisis, but also to
make plans to face this crisis. Calling for an extra session of the state legislature, middleclass Kentuckians forebodingly believed that “we are on the eve of great events.” They
regarded Lincoln’s election “in no other light” than an “open declaration of war against
slavery and the slave states” by the North. Yet despite several southern states, including
South Carolina and Mississippi, making plans to “withdraw from the Union,” most
Kentuckians seemed determined to preserve slavery and their rights while in the Union
instead and “by any means consistent with their peace, honor, and safety,” hoping to
convince the “Northern States to retrace their steps and return to the Constitution they
have so long ignored.”231 Further extending the cause for Union, the writers in the
Louisville Daily Courier inquired upon John Bell and Governor Magoffin’s opinion on
the subject of secession. Both men agreed that although Lincoln had been elected on what
they saw as a solely sectional ticket, while representing a party that desired to see slavery
eradicated in their eyes, Bell believed that his election did not “furnish…sufficient cause
for a State to withdraw from the Union.” Bell’s reasoning was based on his belief that
Lincoln “does not hold extreme opinions” and that the Republicans would not garner
enough support in Congress during his four years in Congress.232 Magoffin shared such
beliefs, stating that Kentucky should remain in the Union until Lincoln “crosses my fence
231
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and advances on my property to execute the threat—then will be time enough, and then
will I be justified in shooting down the villain.” Non-elite Kentuckians reading these
declarations, however, did not agree with these statements. The “Fire Eater” commenting
on Magoffin’s statements clearly stated that “there may be good reason to sustain the
position of [Governor] Magoffin; but if so, he has not given them,” possibly pointing to
the governor’s failed attempts to convince some of his citizens how unnecessary
secession was. 233 Furthermore, the commentators on Bell’s statements argued that if
Lincoln did not have the power to attack slavery and the South while in office and if
abolitionism had not strengthened, then they would not have won the 1860 election at
all.234
While elites might have appeared to not openly support immediate secession after
the election, the following months continued to highlight middle-class Kentuckians’
distaste for Lincoln’s election and the danger he appeared to disclose towards slavery and
the South.235 For instance, citizens reminded others of Lincoln’s supposed efforts in
Congress to support abolition societies and the abolishment of slavery in the District of
Columbia. Now that he was in office, they believed that he would “use the power of his
administration to abolish slavery within the District of Columbia” and “will have both
Houses within his favor by very decided majorities” to see that “not another foot of
territory shall ever be dedicated to slavery.” The majority would be led to conquer the
minority, Kentuckians alleged, and the state needed to decide whether they would be an
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“inferior in the Northern Confederacy with a certain extinction of her property in two
hundred millions dollars’ worth of slaves” or “will take her position where all the other
slave states will be found.”236 A few middle-class Kentuckians called on “people of all
parties in this State” “to resist in last the extremity any attempt to carry out the doctrines
of the Chicago platform,” as Lincoln “cannot and will not recede one inch from the
principles” that would see to slavery exclusion in the West.237 In addition to a loss of
slavery, sources also reveal that white Kentuckians were alerted over the prospect of war
between the North and the current seven seceded states, using Lincoln’s own speeches as
evidence.
Following a speech in Indianapolis, middle-class Kentuckians viewed Lincoln’s
words as a mirror image of his “future policy” and what might become of the nation.238
To these citizens, not only did Lincoln seemingly avow that the majority in the country,
“not the people of the States” nor the Supreme Court, was “to determine whether
Kentucky and Tennessee and Virginia have any rights, and if so, what they are,” but he
also voiced his intent to reclaim the forts, collect revenue, and enforce the laws of the
United States in the southern states.239 In short, the language of his speeches were “not of
a patriot, nor are his positions that of a statesman” to most citizens in the state at the
time.240 Instead, upper and middle-class Kentuckians believed that Lincoln’s speeches at
both Indianapolis and his inauguration in March pointed to one thing: war. For example,
they saw Lincoln’s speeches as a proclamation of “war without the declaration of war,
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waged under false pretenses, and justifiable only to that fanaticism of which [he] is at
once the embodiment and representative” after Indianapolis.241 Elsewhere, one writer
declared that “the policy foreshadowed can only result in war”, while the Frankfort
Yeoman commentator described it as “a policy which, if carried out, will drench the
country in blood.” A citizen writing to the Paris Flag also stated that Lincoln’s
inauguration speech was “war without disguise” as it aimed to not only fulfill the
doctrines of the Chicago platform but also “enforce the laws against the eight Southern
States, compel them to pay taxes and conquer out of their possession the forts and other
property which is in and around their territory.”242
Therefore, middle-class Kentuckians continued to hold onto to their beliefs that
Lincoln seemed to threaten the nation, specifically the South, and slavery, as they had in
previous years. Yet, when it came to their own fate in regards to Lincoln’s presidency
and policies, they appeared to be torn. As already seen, sources following the election of
1860 reveal elites’ and middle-class citizens’ willingness to continue to promote peace
and the maintenance of the Union.243 Moreover, some newspapers in December 1860 and
into 1861 later showed that middle-class Kentuckians also would “do what [it] can for
peace” and compromise, believing that “war should be avoided at every expedient” and
using “all the energies of the statesmen, in our domestic councils and in Washington” for
“the preservation of peace.”244 Elsewhere, they voiced their desire to keep searching for
suitable compromises and unify the Union once more even though several southern states
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had already seceded. Certain that war would occur between the sections, one Kentuckian
urged Kentucky and the border states to “avoid the dreadful calamities of war,” that
“wise and calm counsels will prevail,” and that Lincoln was ready to agree to “some
equivalent terms” that would possibly preserve the Union and coax the Southern states
out of secession. Yet, the writer hoped Kentucky would not be “precipitated into
revolution” but would “stand by the Union and the Constitution and the Enforcement of
the Laws,” seeing to the protection of the rights of all states.245
Also, in early 1861, continued support of the Union was seen through elites and
yeomen’s active support of a peace conference aimed at amending the Constitution and
saving the nation from further calamities. For instance, James Larmon wrote to Magoffin
in January, insisting that the South unite as one body to present “proper amendments on
Slavery revenue and Navigation Laws.” In doing so, he believed the nation would
continue as half slave, half free.246 In Frankfort, Kentucky, a peace congress was
organized to present such suitable compromises to both sections, and several
representatives argued that Kentucky “had a deep and abiding in the perpetuity of the
union of the States with all our constitutional rights . . . to heal the existing breach,
cement it together upon its original principles, and thus destroy the irrepressible conflict
now being waged by Northern and by Southern fanatics.” Representatives then continued
to proclaim the state’s desire to stay in the Union and promote peace by creating
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amendments that would settle the slave question and protect the rights of the South.247
Daring to hope, Kentucky newspapers later noted the successful passage of amendments
to be presented to Congress and the President after the peace conference.248 An unknown
correspondent, confident that some moderate Republicans “sympathize[ed] with the
seceders” and were willing to negotiate, optimistically wrote that “whatever the Peace
Conference may do will be sustained by the people” if they were able to vote on their
amendments presented for the Constitution.249 Another Kentuckian, believing that
Lincoln would not harm slavery, stated that once the seceded states were invited to vote
on these amendments, “the Union men” of the South would be inspired “to such an
organization” as to force the “Disunion men” of these states to present the amendments to
the people for a vote. To this Kentucky citizen, it was in this way that the Union would be
saved, as “whatever plan may be recommended to Congress and the constituents of
Congress, will be largely sustained at the polls.”250 Lastly, Pulaski County citizens also
placed their hope and support in the Union and these compromises in a county meeting
stating that “a time for revolution has not arrived” for Kentucky. Devoting themselves
“for the Union under the Constitution,” these Kentuckians refused “any action on the part
of [the] State Legislature” that would “sanction further dismemberment of the States.”
Instead, they stood by the peaceful resolutions of John J. Crittenden, “compromises” that
would be the “basis for the adjustment of our political troubles.”251 In the end, most
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middle and upper-class Kentuckians, deeply concerned about slavery and the Union’s
fate, pushed to see the United States sustained and had hopes that compromise efforts
committed by John J. Crittenden, the Committee of Thirty-Three, the Committee the
Thirteen, or the Peace Convention between January and March 1861 would be
successful.252 Yet, the writer of the Louisville Daily Journal questioned whether such
peace efforts would be accepted, doubting that the seceded states would accept such
terms that “would not give peace to the country” and where slavery was left as “an open
question” in the territories.253
While some middle-class Kentuckians put their continued faith in the Union and
hoped that peace efforts would settle tensions, several meetings were held not just to
voice their support for the Union, but a Union that respected southern rights. In addition,
these meetings also revealed what middle-class, and possibly some upper-class,
Kentuckians hoped would become of the state should compromise fail and war
commence between the North and the South. “Without distinction of parties,” the citizens
in Boyle, Lincoln and Mercer counties endeavored to have a “Southern Rights Meeting”
in Danville. “Opposed to coercion and in favor of the equality of the states under the
Federal Constitution,” they hoped that countless citizens who favored “peace and
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equality” attended.254 In Lexington, Kentucky, citizens spoke of a “glorious Southern
Rights meeting” held in the city. Viewing the “fearful distractions of our common
country,” these Kentuckians created resolutions where they pledged their “lives,”
“fortunes,” and “honor” “to obtain [their] rights under the Constitution.” Hoping such
rights would be recognized by the North, they desired to “bring back [their] Southern
brethren” and “reconstruct the Federal Union on a basis of justice and equality.” In
addition, and forebodingly, these Kentuckians announced that if their northern neighbors
marched through the state of Kentucky to subdue the South, they would be met with
“bloody hands to hospitable graves” before the state joined the South.255 A southern
rights meeting in Lagrange, supposedly consisting of the entire Seventh Congressional
District, vowed that if “president Lincoln should at any time presume the aspect of war
for the subjugation of the seceding states,” “Kentucky would promptly unsheathe the
sword” for a common cause and “take up arms against the invading force.”256
Others southern rights Kentuckians wondered whether the state would “help pay
the expenses of the war” for the North during such a war or present “a bold and united
front, compel an early recognition of her independence,” and side with the South, as it
was “less expensive, less disastrous in its immediate effects.”257 W.D. McKay, a native
Kentuckian writing to Magoffin and believing that a time for compromise had passed,
expressed his fears that his company may have to escort a group of “Yankees” into
Mississippi. As a result, he believed that any form of “coercion against a seceding state”
254
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would cause Kentuckians to force the legislature to take immediate action, but for what
McKay does not specify.258Another citizen advised “our people to array themselves with
the South and fight with the South,” as Kentucky’s interests and the Constitution itself
laid with the region.259 Lastly, other citizens declared that “if [war] should come,” the
state would be better off standing with their southern states “in a struggle for privilege
and rights common to all the States.”260
Therefore, prior to the attack of Fort Sumter, Kentucky appeared to still exhibit
the characteristics it had shown during John Brown’s Raid and the election campaign of
1860. Not only were most middle- and upper-class Kentuckians making a concerted
effort to see the Union held together and war avoided through appropriate amendments,
but believed that these amendments and compromises should respect southerners’ right to
slavery and also remove the slave question entirely from the political equation. Such
efforts were not made simply because of Kentucky’s devotion to the South, but due to
slavery being seen as a crucial factor to their own independence, as without it, they too
would find themselves losing cherished privileges and freedoms. Additionally, seeing
that war might commence, other white, middle-class Kentuckians made clear their belief
that any attempt to coerce the South back into the Union through force, or march over
Kentucky lands to do so, would be met with resistance and possibly secession. By midApril 1861, however, as Charleston, South Carolina, shook under the heavy gunfire heard
from Fort Sumter while Federal and Confederate forces clashed, Kentucky revealed a rift
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between its citizens’ will and its representatives’ decisions. Aggravated by Lincoln’s
actions in South Carolina, both elite and middle-class Kentuckians seemed to be torn on
whether to support a state secession convention or accept a new, more favorable option:
neutrality.
The event at Fort Sumter itself began with President Lincoln torn over what to do
with the federal forts lying within Charleston Harbor and to which secessionists believed
now belonged to the Confederacy. Historians have contended that because Lincoln did
not wish to bow down to secessionists nor demoralize the Republican Party, he refused to
withdraw federal forces. Instead, he made preparations to resupply Federal Major Robert
Anderson’s troops stationed within Fort Sumter. A request sent to Confederate President,
and former Mississippi senator, Jefferson Davis to permit the delivery of such provisions
resulted in a response from Davis that requested either Fort Sumter’s federal forces
reduced or Major Anderson peacefully evacuating all together. Anderson agreed, but only
if his supplies arrived after April 15. On April 12, 1861, in fact, federal ships were seen
in Charleston Harbor and at 4:30 a.m., the first Confederate shot was heard over Fort
Sumter. It was as the sun rose over Charleston that the nation witnessed the beginning of
a war.261
While various states reacted in their own way to this event, middle-class
Kentuckians’ specific responses appeared to be focused solely on denouncing Lincoln’s
actions and fortifying the state’s defenses. The citizens of Louisville met to declare
themselves “unanimously opposed to the war policy of the Lincoln Administration” and
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that if such attempts to subjugate the South be not abandoned, the state “shall at once
arrange herself side by side with her Southern sisters” “in defending their soil from
hostile invasions.” Nevertheless, while also stating that “it is the immediate and
imperative duty of this State to arm” and that Kentucky would not permit forces to cross
their borders in order to invade the South, Louisville citizens also “implore[ed]
conservative men of all parties of the Free States . . . to arrest the mad, frenzied and
suicidal course of the Lincoln administration” first and foremost.262 Another local
meeting, voicing their abhorrence to Lincoln’s actions, called on the state to “maintain
our position as mediator, and preserve the blessings of peace to our State and to the
Union.” Fighting neither for the North or the South, citizens insisted that the state “stand
for the Union, cry peace, hold fast” upon its own soil, but nonetheless arm the state so
that it may defend itself should forces invade her borders.263 The Louisville Daily Journal
commentators, acknowledging a meeting called by a group of gentlemen to stand against
the actions of Lincoln, also urged Kentuckians to remain for the Union and not give in to
the cries of secessionists who wanted to see the state fall into disunion.264 The men of
Keysburg even took it upon themselves to raise a home guard in order that they may be
prepared for emergencies due to the current state of the nation. They also asked Magoffin
to issue arms to defend themselves.265 John O. McReynolds also sought arms for the
company being formed to defend Kentucky—a request Magoffin denied as this particular
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company being organized was not considered a state guard.266 W.D. Pope of Bracken
County called for arms, as well, for a company of “100 able bodied men” due to the
“present exciting and threatening attitude and condition” of the country.267
It was as May approached, however, that scholars and this study begin to question
whether the state’s delegates heeded the requests and desires of its citizens. Prior to April
12, middle and upper-class citizens seemingly desired that Kentucky continue the fight
for the Union, but pro-southern rights Kentuckians had also declared that if the North
took action against the South or invaded the state, Kentucky would take action to defend
itself and side with the South. Yet, in viewing the sources speaking on Fort Sumter, and
the strong support for the Union they contain, a questions remains: what happened to the
citizens that once advocated for Kentucky joining the South? Why did the state not
immediately join the South? Perhaps, for these Kentuckians, the battle at Fort Sumter was
not an excuse for the state to secede, as Federal forces had not stepped foot onto
Kentucky soil. Historians, however, have noted that this alone was not stopping the state
from seceding. In fact, past studies, letters, and newspapers sources, which show
continued support for the South, also reveal that if given the chance, Kentucky might
have joined the Confederate States through secession. Yet, another option had been
presented to the citizens in the early months of 1861 which swayed them away from
266
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secession entirely, as it not only gave them a chance to continue standing for the Union
their ancestors had fought for, but also to secure the institutions, privileges, and economy
that gave middle-class Kentuckians independency.
Specifically, Kentucky was one state that refused to have a state convention to
vote for or against secession. Such was the case because the state’s legislature seemed to
be unable to come to a consensus and agree to call a convention. This result appeared to
be highly influenced by a power struggle between the Democratic Union Party and the
States Rights Party of Kentucky at the time and that might have pushed the state away
from calling a convention. Local secessionists seemed to have already pointed to this
issue, pressuring Governor Magoffin to call for a state convention, as they believed that
the current legislature did not embody the will of the whole state. Although this is but one
instance, in viewing previous sources showing pro-southern rights Kentuckians wanting
to side with the South should the North take hostile steps towards the region, this
declaration might have been true.268 Once the legislature convened on March 20 to decide
for this, however, neither the Democratic Unionists nor the States Righters gathered
enough votes to force a convention. Thus, the legislature never voted successfully for a
state convention like other southern states due to a lack of confidence and ability by each
party to win. One citizen explained this lack of success by either party in stating that the
legislature simply “did not know what to do,” and that legislators were not willing “to
leave their comfort zone and do anything that might be seen as rash.”269
State Rights party supporters later hoped that such northern aggression in April
would push Kentuckians to support a state convention, but the state’s May elections and
268
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the introduction of neutrality proved otherwise. During this time, also, the border states
were making plans to summon a border state convention to decide on an appropriate plan
to unite the nation. The States Rights Party of Kentucky created a platform for the
convention which supported the Crittenden Compromise, and if not accepted by the
North, Kentucky would secede. Democratic Unionists, on the other hand, supposedly
fearing that the secessionists had far too much power in the state already, pushed the idea
of neutrality in order to keep Kentucky from accepting such a proposal and ultimately
seceding. Such a concept was attractive to most middle-class Kentuckians once it was
presented, historians have argued, for neutrality meant peace, continued efforts to create
compromises concerning slavery and the Union, and consistent trade with both sections.
In sum, neutrality offered middle-class and elite Kentuckians with security for the
valuable practices that enabled their independency, while other options, such as
secession, would only harm these values. Also, since Kentucky was a state directly
situated between northern and southern states, neutrality also meant preventing either side
from using the state as a battleground should war commence.270
Once this option was presented, middle-class Kentuckians against secession went
into detail to explain why such an act was viewed as a mistake to them and neutrality as
more favorable. Although admitting that it was uncertain what Kentucky would look like
if she seceded, these Kentuckians believed that the state would become “more than
Tennessee, more than Virginia…more than any dozen states in the country, the
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battleground of the hosts of the warring sections.”271 Additionally, Kentucky would be
“cut off from all intercourse with the United States, cut off from commerce by land and
water from twenty-three states…and, more and worse, she would not be, as she now is, at
peace.”272 More so, others believed that “secession is undoubtedly the emancipation of
every slave in our state” and would “interfere with…and put an end to” the return of
fugitive slaves to the state.273 Using census returns from 1860 on escaped slaves as a
comparison, middle-class Kentuckians against secession argued that the number of
escaped slaves, which had increased to over a thousand in 1861, would only increase
more so; thus, these citizens questioned how effective secession would be in protecting
the state and slavery if so many were supposedly escaping from the South already.274
Thus, secession was seen as not only destroying the state’s economic relations and
slavery, but forcing citizens back into a state of dependency where they held no social
and racial privileges as white men, nor were able to enjoy the variety of methods to
achieve economic success.
On the other hand, to some white middle and upper-class Kentuckians, neutrality
was seen “as the only position she could take for herself and the Union” so as to avoid “a
desolating war destructive to her institutions, her property, her liberty, and perhaps, her
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religion, without any possible benefit to herself.”275 The Frankfort Yeoman writers
viewed neutrality as a way for “Kentucky to take up arms for neither for the one section
or for the other,” but continue to “perform all her legal and constitutional duties as a state
of the United States.”276 Others saw the act as having “kept war from her fair and
innocent borders, and preserved the peace amongst her people.”277 Several county
citizens also saw neutrality as a chance for the State to avoid war and to arm itself instead
“to act upon the defensive,” and “repel attack.” They believed it was imperative for the
state to acquire arms in order to “place the soldiers of Kentucky in a position to defend
the honor and soil of their State”, while another writer stated that the state must be
“armed to the teeth” in order to keep from having to “furnish [Lincoln] aid or supplies of
no kind for carrying on his war.”278 One press boldly stated “No North, no South, but one
Union,” for Kentucky should remain as a mediator between the sections, stay part of the
Union, furnish the South with supplies if need be, and “find friends in the North to aid us
against Lincoln” while neutral.279 In this way, it did not have to risk fighting alongside
the North to put down their sister states in the South, nor risk losing their independency
(or the slaves and economic prosperity that went along with it) by seceding, but was still
considered a part of the Union it so determinedly supported.280 Some middle-class
citizens later declared that neutrality was working, as they were “the only state owning
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slaves that is not rent by civil war and strife” and that “there is no crater that is about to
burst forth in our State” that would force them out of neutrality.281
Therefore, in May 1861, scholars have argued that citizens understood that a vote
for the States Rights Party meant a vote for war, while voting for the Democratic
Unionists had meant a vote for peace, and such a belief produced an overwhelming
victory for the Democratic Union Party for the border state convention. In addition, the
States Rights Party chose not to denounce the idea of neutrality because it was so widely
supported and they feared being accused as the war party and losing support. Even so,
this party believed the citizens would better support secession later should sectional
tensions escalate.282 Upon closer inspection, however, it is shown the State Rights
supporters simply refused to vote in the May elections because they believed that “peace
had come and gone” and saw “no point in holding a border state convention.” One party
member saw that participating in an election for a border state convention and “[talk of
compromise] is . . . nonsense & child play . . . for there is no earthly reason to restore the
Union & Kentucky is compelled to take position with the seceded states.” In fact, over
106,000 registered voters—most of which came from counties who had voted for
Breckenridge in 1860—refused to vote in the election, and most of these votes were
believed to belong to the States Rights Party.283
Based on these sources, it is presumed then that prior to the events at Fort Sumter
the majority of middle-class Kentuckians, and some elites, not only supported the Union

281

Louisville Daily Journal, 26 June 1861. Over 262 examples within local newspapers were
discovered that discussed neutrality in the state, as well.
282
Finck, Divided Loyalties, 101-102.
283
Blanton Duncan to W.C.P. Breckenridge, Apr.6, 1861, Breckenridge Family Papers, LOC,
quoted from Robinson, A Union Indivisible, 171; Finck, Divided Loyalties, 111.

112

but also desired to stand by the South should the North attempt to move against the
region. Had Kentucky succeeded in calling for a state convention in the early months of
1861 the state might have seceded. In addition, had missing voters participated in the
state elections after the attack at Fort Sumter, the Democratic Unionists might not have
celebrated such a massive victory and the border state convention could have been more
likely to push for States’ Rights platform for the Crittenden Compromise and possibly
secession.284
Additionally, to further reveal that secessionist sentiment in Kentucky and the
anxiety Democratic Unionists seemingly held over the strength of the State Rights Party
might have been stronger than previously documented, both parties in the state erected
their own state militias. Already, the state had created the State Guard in March 1860, a
militia system that consisted of men who had “Southern loyalties” and were prosecession. The number of militia increased to sixty-one companies in April 1861, and
supposedly alarmed by the growing strength of this force led by an “officer corps . . .
[with] an overwhelming majority of secessionists,” scholars have argued that Democratic
Unionists created their own militia, the Home Guard, and ensured the passage a military
bill that split funds for arms between both militias. Additionally, they also created a
military board that excluded Governor Magoffin—an individual Unionists feared would
force the state into disunion with the use of the State Guard. Moreover, Kentucky
Unionists also secretly began strengthening their own Home Guard by accepting arms
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from the North, distributing them to citizens across the state “in order to achieve their
contradictory objective of keeping the state safely in the Union.”285
In short, scholars have argued that Kentucky was not as pro-Union as some have
contended. If it were, Democratic Unionists would not have presented the idea of
neutrality to the public in order to keep secession at bay. Additionally, sources prior to
April 1861 and Democratic Unionists’ actions during the May elections continually
showed that there might have been a stronger support for secession in the state after all by
how quickly they presented neutrality and began to raise their own militia and weapons to
overpower the State Guard’s strength in the state.286 Letters and newspapers sources also
add to this argument in revealing continued support for the South and secession by
middle-class, and possibly some elite, Kentuckians following Lincoln’s call for 75,000
volunteers, while simultaneously explaining why neutrality was seen as a mistake by
other citizens.
Several counties, learning of the attack on Fort Sumter, boldly reasserted their
support of the South and secession. Citizens of Logan, Lyon, Scott, Fayette, and Mercer
counties all exhibited “a unanimous southern feeling.” “Secession feeling is gaining
rapidly,” locals declared, waving Confederate flags, supporting the arming of Kentucky
and its immediate secession, and believing that “in a united South is our only hope”
against the North.287 Additionally, Nelson, Hardin, Hickman, and Simpson county
citizens echoed one another in their hatred towards Lincoln’s war policy and informed
newspapers that they were gathering volunteers for the “Southern Army” and vowing

285

Finck, Divided Loyalties, 124- 132; Robinson, A Union Indivisible, 173.
Finck, Divided Loyalties, 132.
287
Louisville Daily Courier, 19 April 1861.
286

114

“resistance to the last drop.”288 Moreover, countless meetings were occurring throughout
the state in support of secession. Harrodsburg, “a majority of the Guards being
secessionists” in the town, noted a meeting of masked members of the Knights of the
Golden Circle and several secessionists in the town and questioned “what sort of work
can it be that makes men huddle together under ‘the blanket of the dark.’”289 The Knights
of the Golden Circle also proclaimed that “Kentuckians will never desert the South” and
pleaded with their fellow brethren to “organize and save the state for the white man and
the struggling brothers in the South.”290 Elsewhere, an unknown writer called on men to
gather at a local courthouse who were “resolved to stand by their Southern brethren to the
end, if the attempt to subjugate them is not abandoned.”291 Military companies began
organizing around Louisville, also, “for the protection of the City,” and writers in the
Louisville Daily Courier highlighted the presence of companies who were leaving the
state “to fight for the cause of the South” and would do “honor to the ancient fame of
Kentucky.”292 Lastly, southern rights Kentuckians of Bloomsfield, Kentucky, were seen
displaying a “Southern Rights flag, a true symbol of Constitutional liberty” in the town,
while Paducah, Kentucky, originally believing that the secession feeling had died out
locally, witnessed “young men running to their mothers, fathers, and family, saying—
Farewell, I may never see you again” and that “some of the volunteers of this place will
soon make a break South.”293

288

Louisville Daily Courier, 18 April 1861.
Louisville Daily Journal, 14 June 1861; Louisville Daily Courier, 11 July 1861.
290
Louisville Daily Courier, 15 April 1861.
291
Louisville Daily Courier, 15 April 1861.
292
Louisville Daily Courier, 24 April 1861.
293
Louisville Daily Courier, 6 June 1861; Louisville Daily Journal, 31 May 1861. See also B.W.
Sharpe to John J. Pettus, 14 April 1861, Box 931, Folder 9, State Government Records, Mississippi
Department of Archives and History; James P. Martin to Beriah Magoffin, 8 January 1861, Office of the
289

115

Yet, in regard to neutrality and believing “it would be destructive of every
material interest of the Commonwealth and oppressive and ruinous to her people,” some
pro-secession Kentuckians chose to nonetheless accept it “as a temporary measure, a
position to be occupied until the people can act directly on the question,” hoping that
Kentucky would eventually secede.294 The Louisville Daily Courier editors, denouncing
the actions of Lincoln against the South as, in their view, a war against slavery, believed
that the “neutrality men” had deceived the people of Kentucky and pushed them into “the
embraces of the great Black Republican Party” in voting to give men and money “for the
subjugation of their Southern brethren” unbeknownst to Kentuckians. The Courier
commentators feared that unless “the eyes of every man and woman in Kentucky . . . be
opened” and fight against neutrality, the state would “bear the doom of the Slaveholding
States, without the honor of having struck one blow for freedom and her God-given
rights.”295 In short, pro-secession Kentuckians believed that “armed neutrality was
nothing more than armed rebellion” and only led to an “invasion either by the North or
South.” They sought to defend their reasoning in stating that “if they do not admit the
doctrine that a State has a right to secede,” then what right have they “to take arms and
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refuse and support the Government to which they propose to owe paramount
allegiance.”296
Therefore, it is possible that there was a disconnect between elite politicians and
middle- to working-class Kentuckians between Lincoln’s election and the events at Fort
Sumter, as citizens’ representatives might have been focusing more on remaining in
power. It is also possible that had the supporters of the States Rights Party voted within
the May elections, the state might have witnessed a different outcome for the elections
and later the border state convention. Nevertheless, despite this and numerous prosecession Kentuckians sympathizing and fighting alongside the South both before and
after Fort Sumter, it cannot be denied that neutrality was an attractive option for middleclass Kentuckians who favored peace and continued relations between both sections, as
both elite and middle-class Kentuckians had readily fought to for the Union prior to 1861.
In the end, the majority of elite and middle-class Kentuckians came together in their
choice for neutrality in order to keep slavery and maintain their economic privileges,
assurances they believed were not offered through secession or fighting with the South.
Whether or not the state’s fate might have looked differently had certain events or actions
occurred, in the end, the state chose neutrality on May 20, 1861 for a multitude of reasons
that would result in the protection of their cherished independency. Mississippi,
contrarily, sought no such option, and its people were seen as more united in their
decision to secede as 1861 began.
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Mississippi’s Response
Lincoln’s election created in Mississippi what some have called “an air of semiintoxication,” as not only the legislature but counties scrambled to make preparations for
the state’s protection for both its citizens and institutions—an image that looked starkly
different from Kentucky’s response.297 On the 26 of November, Governor Pettus desired
an extra session of the legislature to be held. There, he hoped not only to gather funds to
arm the state, but also to call a state convention to decide Mississippi’s future. The
legislature agreed, requesting the election of delegates while simultaneously sending out
envoys to other slave states to convince them to follow Mississippi’s lead into
disunion.298 Overall, it was clear that while Kentucky might have first advocated for
continued compromise in the Union, elite and middle-class Mississippians readily
shouted for secession in the following months, as many believed that “the Union is dead”
or that “safety could no longer be found in the union.”299
Local Mississippi newspapers and letters showed this growing need among white
to secede and prepare for the state’s defense following the election. Due to “the bad faith
of the non-slaveholding members,” the Semi-Weekly Mississippian editors saw that “the
Union has been broken and virtually dissolved.” Believing that separation and the
creation of a “Southern Confederacy” was imminent, the editors also hoped that other
slaveholding states would “cooperate in the resistance movement which has been
297
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resolved upon by Mississippi” while also stating that states like Georgia, South Carolina,
and Louisiana were prepared to act immediately, as well.300 Moreover, various counties
across the state began to hold their own county meetings to voice their views concerning
current events.
Citizens of Yazoo, DeSoto, Jefferson, Winston, and Jackson counties immediately
voiced their concern over Lincoln’s election, as well as their support for the current
meeting of the legislature and ultimately secession. “To take into consideration the
current dangers by which the South is threatened,” Yazoo County believed that the
Republican Party might now use all their power to eliminate slavery and “their just
participation in the benefits of our Government,” and that they supported “any effectual
measure which looks to the security of our rights, our peace, and our safety.” In Winston
County, in order to protect “Southern Rights and Southern Institutions from the
encroachment of the Black Republican party who are about to overturn the principles of
Equality,” middle-class citizens saw it fit that Mississippi should “sever the bonds that
unite the Northern and Southern States, and throw ourselves back on our original
sovereignty and independence.”301 Viewing the North as having done little to preserve
the Union and acknowledging the “humiliation of compromise and concession has come
from the South,” Copiah County citizens ruled that they would no longer “submit, and
beg and sue for room to live here upon the soil our fathers won.”302 Claiborne County
also showed wide support for the election of delegates to the state convention “in favor of
prompt and separate State action, and the formation of a Southern Confederacy”

300

The Daily Mississippian, 1 December 1860.
Semi-Weekly Mississippian, 7 December 1860.
302
Weekly Mississippian, 5 December 1860.
301

119

alongside citizens of DeSoto County who believed in the “right of a State to withdraw
from the Union” and become an “independent sovereign State.”303 Clearly, these
Mississippians believed that they were no longer safe with Lincoln as president, as he
was not only threatening slavery but the rights which allowed them to participate in
government and determine their state’s future.
Besides meeting and creating resolutions asserting their views, however, white
middle-class Mississippians also expressed their support for the South through the
organization of military companies in response to the election. Writing to Governor
Pettus, James A. Penn informed him of the creation of the “Brandon Artillery” due to the
“Critical condition of political affairs of the country” and readily sent the unit’s
resolutions.304 More specifically, J.T.W. Hairston rendered his services to the state,
believing that “some decisive action upon the part of all true men of the State and of the
South” should be taken for the “safety and perpetuasion of the institutions of the State,
and of the South.”305 Several citizens in Columbus, Mississippi, also joined Hairston in
offering their services “in defense of Mississippi and the South,” asking Pettus to arm
them quickly with the “Sabre Bayonet Rifle” so they may begin drilling and be ready for
the “Minute Call.”306 W.G. Paxton of Vicksburg informed Pettus of the “large majority in

303

Weekly Mississippian, 12 December 1860. See also Weekly Mississippian, 12 December 1860;
Weekly Mississippian, 7 November 1860; Semi-Weekly Mississippian, 25 December 1860; Semi-Weekly
Mississippian, 14 December 1860; J.B. Hancock to John J. Pettus, 14 November 1860, Box 930, Folder
10, Item 15, State Government Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History; G. Harrison to
John J. Pettus, 18 November 1860, Box 930, Folder 10, Item 21, State Government Records, Mississippi
Department of Archives and History; Charles D. Fontaine to John J. Pettus, 12 November 1860, Box 930,
Folder 10, Item 08, State Government Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
304
James A. Penn to John J. Pettus, 27 December 1860, Box 931, Folder 1, Item 16, State
Government Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
305
J.T.W. Hairston to John J. Pettus, 12 November 1860 Box 930, Folder 10, Item 9, State
Government Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
306
Et al to John J. Pettus, 29 November 1860, Box 930, Folder 11, Item 11, State Government
Records, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.

120

favor of immediate secession” as he requested arms for the ever increasing “Warren
Guards,” while James Whitfield revealed that Lowndes County was filled with “the right
spirit” as it prepared to arm a company of sixty men and delegates to be sent to the state
convention.307
Yet, while secession sentiments were readily voiced in the state, there were a few
instances where middle-class citizens pleaded with the state to either remain in the Union
or at least wait to secede with other southern states. Similar to the beliefs of some middleclass Kentuckians, several middle-class Mississippians believed that “secession was no
remedy,” as it was seen as destructive to slavery, would “shut us out, forever, from the
occupation of new territories,” increase the number of fugitive slaves, and cause the
nation to “abandon our position as a mighty power among the nations.” Instead, a few
citizens suggested that “amendments of the Constitution can be suggested, which will
secure slave property and the peace of the South” as the current Union had always
accomplished more than they could have every asked for in the past.308
Elsewhere, the Vicksburg Daily Whig writers questioned what would happen to
Mississippi, Virginia, Kentucky, and other southern states should they secede—whether
they would become their own nation or combine to form a new confederacy. This press
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also stated that “there should be no separate state secession,” but instead a conference of
all aggrieved states should agree to send “constitutional obligations to the Northern
people,—or upon its final rejection will go out of the Confederacy as a unit.”309 Madison
County citizens agreed, believing there was no reason for Mississippi to secede and that
her people should “plan wisely and act deliberately in concert with all the slave states”
and continue to “resist, by all Constitutional modes, any and every aggression upon the
rights of the South” while demand[ing] “equality in the Union, or independence out of
it.”310 Citizens in Tippah, Lafayette, Hinds, Warren, and Issaquena counties echoed
these beliefs, voting for cooperationist delegates to the state convention to stop
immediate secession, while other middle-class Mississippians viewed the gathering of all
slave states the more favorable option, as by seceding alone, a state would “by hasty,
rash, immature counsels, divide the slave states and leave a portion of them to the mercy
of the Black Republicans” while also weakening slavery simultaneously.311
In short, while there were a few middle-class, and some upper-class citizens who
argued against the idea of immediate secession, it must also be noted that these citizens
were not arguing against secession itself. Instead, they wanted the state to act alongside
its fellow slave states, and if all avenues of compromise were exhausted, then they could
secede. In doing so, they believed slavery and the state would be kept from further harm.
Unfortunately, while some counties might have hoped that their cooperationist delegates
would be successful at the January secession convention, the results nevertheless dashed
309
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their hopes.312 While the convention might have encountered issues of its own at the State
Capitol, delegates eventually agreed, altered, and signed the Ordinance of Secession,
consisting of four sections which emphasized that Mississippi’s secession was caused by
the threat to slavery, on January 15, 1861.313
While politicians struggled to work out the fine details of Mississippi’s new
independence, white, middle-class Mississippians flooded newspapers on their thoughts
and feelings before and after secession was finalized. Some viewed Mississippi as having
“declared, by a vote approaching unanimity, that she will not continue to be a member of
the Union,” and that “the voice of our people is unmistakable” and “will lend all their
energies to perfecting and making effectual, the policy that may be determined upon by
the Convention.” In addition, these Mississippians hoped that cooperationists of the
Convention would “make its action unanimous” by voting also for secession and
following the “popular will” of the people.314 In Oxford, local citizens witnessed “over
the secession of Mississippi,” that a band “could not play ‘Dixie’ often enough for
enthusiastic crowd,” which they considered to be “the new song of the Confederacy.”315
The students of the University of Mississippi might have been present during such
312
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festivities, but nonetheless celebrated Mississippi’s secession by marching through the
streets playing various instruments, while a Kosciusko secessionist, “stock lock and
barrel,” revealed the continued fervor to organize local companies in the state when he
mentioned the presence of a local militia ready to march to South Carolina “in pursuit of
glory on the field of honor."316 Others declared that due to the actions of the North in
what they viewed as preventing slavery’s extension and ultimately the South’s rights,
“the idea of reconstruction” of the Union “is preposterous. To entertain it, even, partakes
of the character of moral treason.”317
While the majority of its middle-class citizens were pleased with the state’s
independence and as Jefferson Davis bid farewell the Senate to fulfill his duty as
President to the new Confederacy, Mississippi did not experience immediate peace and
prosperity.318 In addition to rumors of slave insurrections and “vigilance committees” to
keep slave revolts in check, the state also dealt with an influx of military companies that
had no war to fight.319 The Daily Mississippian commentators reported a rumor in
December 1860 that upon secession, the southern states, including Mississippi, “would be
whipped into submission—aye, whipped and cowed like slaves by . . . a hireling army led
316
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on and directed by abolitionists.”320 In Illinois, a resident wrote to Governor Pettus on the
organization of the “Mississippi Society” consisting of a group of men who intended to
infiltrate the state as overseers to cause a slave insurrection similar to John Brown’s
raid.321 Elsewhere W. H. McCardle of Vicksburg warned the Mississippi governor that “a
raid similar to that of Harper’s Ferry” might occur in Issaquena County and asked for
suitable arms for his citizens to deal with the matter quickly.322 Moreover, the Oxford
Intelligencer seemed convinced that “Lincoln has his agents in every Southern locality.”
Although their reasons for doing so were not mentioned, the press nonetheless advised
that “strangers . . . should be closely watched, and, if necessary, prevented from
leaving.”323
While acknowledging these warnings, Governor Pettus in the early months of
1861 made military preparations in the form of troops sent to “federal installations at
Florida”, the creation of a state armory, by sending military companies to Mobile,
Alabama, and the acquirement of weapons from surroundings states. It was said that “war
fever” had captured the minds of citizens by March, as well, as seen by their quick
formation of over eighty companies in the state when only four to seven companies were
needed for service at the time. In addition, several counties failed to plant an appropriate
amount of crops, causing starvation and bankruptcy to which the state leaders “responded
in a wholly inadequate manner” by requesting these areas issue bonds to the treasury as a
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solution.324 Governor Pettus himself was left with inappropriate legislation to handle
these issues and had little assistance from the Military Board, created to keep him from
overextending his military ambitions, or from the Confederate government, who often
lost messages or took too long to respond.325 Nevertheless, the governor continued to
request firearms for the growing number of companies in the state eager to fight despite
having inadequate funds to support the state’s hospitals, fortifications, and lighthouses.326
Yet, while having to work through these trying issues, Mississippi found itself in the new
Confederacy on March 29, 1861, whereas most of its elite and middle-class citizens
continued to show that war had already begun with a northern enemy whose intentions
against slavery and southern rights, they believed, were clear.
Before the battle at Fort Sumter, an unknown Mississippi county believed that
“the political weathercock . . . is now unmistakably pointing in the direction of war.”
Citizens had seen “many vessels, laden with troops and munitions of war, have left
Northern ports under sealed orders,” yet, “war has no terrors” for citizens would not
“shrink from the contest, when their rights shall be invaded by the foe.” In the county
“five hundred more will promptly go forward to meet the enemy” should they be
called.327 Unbelieving at first, one unknown Mississippian stated that “war has actually
commenced” and “the problem of peace and war is now solved” after Fort Sumter’s
capture. While Mississippi and the other Confederate States might have preferred peace,
this writer assumed, “if the Lincolnites are not to be satisfied without testing their mettle
on the battle field, the Confederates will be ready” “to repel any attempt to subjugate
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them.”328 This writer assumed that the North had declared “to preserve the connection
regardless of your rights and interests—we will send our fleets and armies to keep you in
the Union, and subjugate you if necessary,” but that the southern people would
nevertheless unite and “endure with composure and fortitude the evils and sufferings the
war may entail, in order to vindicate their rights and maintain their honor.”329 Elsewhere,
the Eastern Clarion wrote that “the real cause of the present day fury of the North, is the
impending ruin of their commerce and manufactures” due to the loss of the South, and
fearing “the downfall of the greatness and glory,” “it seeks to hold [the South] by force”
instead.”330 Others simply wished that Lincoln and those in Washington face the fact of
secession and accept it. If not, in calling for seventy-five thousand volunteers, “Mr.
Lincoln will meet difficulties in every step in his attempt to coerce the South and
reconstruct the old Union by force,” for he would find no supporters in the South, as
those who had once resisted secession now stood “zealous and determined to see it out to
the bitter end” alongside the rest of Mississippi and the South.331
Yet while elite and yeomen across the state were organizing and accepting that
war had come, northern presses—similar to John Brown’s Raid—tried to convince the
South that few northerners approved of Lincoln’s current war policy. Reporting from
Connecticut, one northern press insisted that “public opinion in the North seemed to be
gradually settling down in favor of the recognition of the new Confederacy.” To other
northern citizens, “the thought of bloody and protracted civil war . . . was abhorrent to all
328
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and its issues may be as perilous to the victor as the vanquished.”332 Furthermore, by
forcing the South back into the Union, some northerners believed that it would involve
“great expenditure of treasure and life” and would result only in “changing the present
alienation to deadly hostility and incurable hate.” The democrats of Newark, New Jersey,
also declared that they were “in favor of the speediest possible termination of the war,”
while a citizen in Maine, whose “livelihood is so intimately associated with ship building
and the cotton trade,” feared what the consequences of war would be if England were to
establish trade relations with the South and eastern vessels . . . thrown out of
employment.”333 In sum, several northern presses believed that “the North has been
deceived . . . and misled in every particular relating to the force, the ability and the
courage of the foe.” Viewing the South as far more capable of participating in a war, both
militarily, financially, and economically, than northerners were seemingly led to believe
by “Northern Republican presses,” they insisted that “there is little hope of an end of the
war by a decisive battle or a short campaign.” The writers of the Concord Standard of
New Hampshire believed that the fault lay solely on select members of the Republican
Party, such as William H. Seward, who if the war lasted more than three years, “will be
obliged to flee their country or receive a traitor’s fate.”334
Sources do not clearly show middle-class Mississippians responding to these
northern presses, but their presence alone might indicate that some Mississippi presses
were attempting to reassure the public that reconciliation with the North remained.
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Regardless, most middle-class Mississippians seemed unperturbed by these instances and
were more preoccupied with preparing themselves for their defense as a part of a new
Confederacy. Throughout the state, citizens were seen organizing companies and
awaiting orders. For example, Oxford, Mississippi, witnessed “the scene of a regular
military encampment, from the numerous companies of volunteers who have arrived here
from Alabama and North Mississippi, on their way to Fort Morgan and Pensacola,” as if
answering the call of Governor Pettus for eight thousand troops “to resist the coercive
measures of the Washington Administration.”335 Several Mississippi counties also began
to raise, arm, and send off companies of men to battle. Citizens of Jasper County desired
to call a meeting “for the purpose of raising a military company for the service of the
Confederacy,” and lamented that the county had not already begun raising such a military
unit.336 Oak Bowery, Mississippi also called for a meeting to raise “a company of ‘Home
Guards,’” whereas the Daily Evening Citizen of Vicksburg issued several ads in its paper
calling for more men to enlist in local companies and promising the appropriate supplies
and equipment if they did.337 Franklin County also boasted that the “war spirit so
prevalent throughout the entire regions of the South” had manifested in the country, as
well. As a result, “an array of volunteers,” such as the “Franklin Guards” and the
“Beauregards,” had gathered and proved that the county was not as submissive as many
men had suspected.338
Local presses additionally revealed that some of these companies were already on
the move in and outside the state. Vicksburg pointed to the arrival of the “Claiborne
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Guards” from a steamer bound for Corinth and two additional Mississippi regiments
“ordered into camp.”339 The “Noxubee Rifles” of Paulding, Mississippi, upon arriving in
Tenneesee, wrote to the Eastern Clarion to inform citizens of the strong secessionist
sentiment in the state, the fervor of local women who “seemed to exceed the men in zeal
for the good cause,” and the soldiers’ encounters with Union men.340 Both Natchez and
Vicksburg citizens drew attention to the departure of the “Volunteer Southrons” and the
“Adams Troop,” “who go forth to battle for our rights, our liberties, and our honor” and
were leaving behind “the luxuries and appliances of wealth, the pleasant companionship
of friends…for the rough fare of a soldier, the constant fatigue of camp, and the
inevitable dangers of the battle field.”341 Lastly, Canton, Mississippi, citizens welcomed
the “Madison Guards” in July 1861, whose captain called “upon the people to contribute
their money for the benefit of this company” before leaving for Virginia.342
Help, in fact, was what some elite and middle-class Mississippians were willing to
offer to assist soldiers and men who had refused to enlist themselves. A wealthy citizen
of Warren County sought to donate five thousand dollars “to uniform and equip our
volunteer companies,” and vowed that “his whole estates…will be expended to maintain
Southern rights, honor and independence.”343 The ladies of Oxford, all who were able to
“ply a needle or ‘speak out in a meeting,’” were asked to meet at Cumberland Church
“for the purpose of organizing a society to assist the army of the Confederacy.” Knowing
that there were several ladies who had been “sewing for the troops,” Oxford insisted that
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this organization would be “more convenient and beneficial.”344 Ladies in Mount Albon
and Bovina, however, found travel to these meetings in Vicksburg tedious and began
preparations for creating their own organization that would serve as “an auxiliary to the
Vicksburg Association.” Yet, when the ladies and various men of the state were not
contributing to the war effort through appropriate funds and organizations, others ladies
of South Mississippi chose to express their disdain towards the young men who refused
to participate in the war “by sending hoopskirts, nightcaps, &c” and the Weekly Panola
Star suggested they send some north, as well, for the “several who need them, as they
have nothing else to do but wear them.”345
Therefore, it is seen that following the election of Abraham Lincoln, most white,
middle and upper-class Mississippians seemed united in the effort to see their state
secede, as they saw it as the only method of maintaining their power over important
practices that benefited them socially and financially. In viewing Lincoln’s election as
both unacceptable and threatening, White Mississippians immediately sought ways to
arm the state, and while there were a few middle-class Mississippians who desired that
the state wait, delegates of the secession convention accepted secession as the state’s best
option in keeping slavery, their rights, and in all, their power. Afterwards, middle-class
citizens’ activities consisted mostly of organizing and drilling companies, while a few
had the pleasure of being sent to places like Mobile, Alabama, Pensacola, Florida, or
other states north of Mississippi. While these activities were not without its frustrations,
they nevertheless accepted that war would and had come, especially after the attack on
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Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s call for troops. Ultimately, middle-class Mississippians’ wide
support of secession after 1860 was not a thoughtless decision based solely on fear or
economic gain. Instead, Mississippi’s decision to abandon compromise efforts and secede
was widely based on their desire to protect their power over to their slaves, honor, and
their futures as white Mississippians.
The Meaning Behind “Kentuckian” and “Mississippian”
As already examined, middle-class Kentuckians and Mississippians had different,
and various, reactions to the election of Abraham Lincoln and later the attack of Fort
Sumter in April 1861. Yet, why did two seemingly similar states, who acted in
accordance with one another during John Brown’s Raid and the campaign season of
1860, choose two very different paths in 1861? Why would middle-class Mississippians,
who in part held unionist sentiments in 1859 and 1860, decide to leave the Union? Why
did middle-class Kentuckians, so devoted it seemed to stand by their allies in the South,
decide for neutrality? One might immediately assume from the evidence seen in previous
chapters that Kentucky and Mississippi would venture into secession together due to their
anxieties over the Republican Party’s doctrines, which they saw as threatening valuable
practices that gave them so many social and economic privileges. Yet, the outcome
revealed different results.
The reason behind middle-class Kentuckians’ unique decision in 1861 lay behind
an identity that was grounded in the idea of independency, formed during the state’s
establishment and which relied upon select practices in order to survive, such as slavery
and economic success. In comparison to states like Mississippi, Kentucky’s population
only constituted nineteen percent of slaves, while only twenty-eight percent of the white
132

population owned slaves. In addition, Kentucky’s economy was not solely dependent on
slavery to survive. Because of the states’s climate, crops like corn, tobacco, hemp, and
other food products were more successful and did not require large groups of slaves to
cultivate and harvest. Raising livestock, another staple activity in the state, also did not
require many slaves. In addition to the climate, Kentucky farmers also felt the need to
diversify their crops, unlike southern planters, in order to cater to the surrounding market.
Thus, Kentucky often found itself with an overabundance of slaves that were either
rented to nonslaveowners or sold “down river” to the Deep South.346 Therefore, elite and
middle-class Kentuckians’ defense of slavery during the events prior to and during the
secession crisis was tied exclusively to racial and social control.
Historians have argued that Kentucky as whole in the 1860s did not see slavery as
a positive good, nor believed it was completely required for the state’s economy.
Furthermore, scholars state that some of its citizens believed that African Americans
contained the same “natural rights” as whites, but slavery was nonetheless needed in
order to “ensure the safety and well-being of both races.” Such was the case because
white Kentuckians had determined that “African Americans had become institutionalized
by slavery,” and that “generational slavery” made them “lazy, hostile, corrupt, and . . .
inferior to white people,” and such hostility inbred a natural hatred towards whites.”
Freedom to slaves also constituted the belief that economic competition between the two
races would strengthen and that an “amalgamation” between African American males
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and white women might occur, as well.347 Lastly, as noted in previous chapters, white
Kentuckians were granted social and political influence due to their skin color, which
could be threatened should slavery not exist.348 Thus, in the eyes of most upper and
middle-class Kentuckians writing between 1859 and 1861 in response to Brown’s raid
and the presidential election, slavery needed to be protected in order to sustain peace and
control, but other historians have argued that these theories were tied to the single belief
among Kentuckians that African Americans were not equal to whites.349 Taken together
then, disdaining the thought of sharing their social, economic, and political rights with
slaves and fearing that a freed black population would lead to insurrections, middle-class
and elite Kentuckians sought to keep slavery intact by any means possible in order to
maintain “social and racial control.”350
Yet slavery and its protection alone did not solely influence Kentucky’s decision
in 1861. Kentucky at this time held an economy that depended on and was relied upon by
both sections of the nation. Through rivers and railroads, planters and yeomen in the state
could easily make a profit off of farming and slavery, selling products southward, or by
investing in the ever growing manufacturing industry that had its roots in the North. This
allowed not only for the elites to continue growing in wealth, but also for middle and
working-class Kentuckians to obtain an honest living without slaves and possibly
increase their own wealth.351 Moreover, as the secession crisis began and Kentucky
factions debated over secession, the Union, and the effect of each on the state’s economy,
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Kentucky Unionists argued that the North was a more viable customer due to its large
population and whose high tariffs would be unaffordable should Kentucky side with the
South. Additionally, a seceded South still needed to continue trade with Kentucky, as the
Bluegrass State provided the majority of its food supplies. Secessionists, on the other
hand, believed that in siding with the South Kentucky’s trade would increase in
profitability, as they would no longer be competing with Midwestern states in the trade of
food or the North in textile production. Instead, Kentucky would be the leader in
providing the South with supplies and manufactured goods.352
In the end, studies have shown that Kentucky’s decision stood with which section
could protect slavery and their diversified economy the most, unlike the Deep South
where protecting slavery was protecting their economy.353 Already in 1861, and as more
states in the Upper South seceded, Kentucky saw its economy greatly affected. Sales in
slaves dropped and one Kentucky woman even wrote of starvation, lack of food for stock,
and the inability of merchants to collect and supply food.354 Yet, coming to a decision in
the midst of a torn nation, sources have revealed that middle-class Kentuckians
themselves were split, as they saw both the Unionist and secessionist parties with
convincing arguments on whether to side with the North or the South, but each decision
would also result in harmful effects on slavery, Kentucky’s economy, and their people.355
Additionally, choosing one side over the other still likely led to war and destruction of
Kentucky property. By this point then, a growing number of white, elite and middle-class
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Kentuckians viewed neutrality as best serving the interests of the state and reducing the
possibility of harming slavery, the economy, and other practices which contributed to
their day to day lives. One historian noted that Kentuckians were far from scared during
this crisis, but “acted cautiously” and believed that the best choice was no choice at all. In
a neutral position, while simultaneously seeking peace and compromise, middle-class
Kentuckians reasoned that slavery would remain intact, trade on each side would
continue, and war would remain a hollow threat. Lastly, citizens would remain in the
United States, holding onto the Union and standing alongside it as American patriots, as
if following in the footsteps of their predecessor, Henry Clay.356
In all, it was not just their need to protect themselves, slavery, and their economy
that influenced middle-class Kentuckians’ decision in 1861. It was also the idea they
hoped to protect by securing these practices. By viewing themselves as solely
“Kentuckian,” and defending the perceived privileges mentioned above, middle-class and
elite Kentuckians were also guarding the founding idea they cherished above all else:
independency. While this study has shown middle-class Kentuckians favoring southern
rights, slavery, and the Union from 1859 to 1861, sources have also shown that their
allegiances lied first and foremost with Kentucky itself. In comparison to Mississippi,
where citizens consistently addressed themselves as bound to other southern states, by
1861, middle-class Kentuckians, as well as elites, discussed the defense of their own state
from invaders more in their communications with the governor and the public rather than
the Confederacy or the Union, specifically after neutrality was introduced. They sought to
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protect their own self-interests, rather than take sides and initiate war that might lead to
the state’s ruin.
Such is the case because this identity of “Kentuckian,”—an identity formed
through settlement within the Ohio River Valley—carried with it the strong desire for
independency and the privileges that were needed to obtain it. As discussed earlier, while
that independency might have been threatened by Virginia gentry, who forced most
settlers into tenancy in the 1700s, middle- and working-class Kentuckians regained power
over their lives through the superiority of their white skin.357 Racial and social control for
the protection of the white population and the immobility of black slaves aided white
middle- and working-class Kentuckians in gaining racial, political, and economic
superiority, along with the emergence of industrialization, active markets, and the
position of the state between both sections of the nations. These factors alone produced
an environment in Kentucky where white citizens could achieve the independency early
settlers had longed for—a value that depended on a person’s skin color, the enslavement
of blacks, and active trade throughout the nation. Neutrality, then, was an isolated
decision made by middle-class and elite Kentuckians to protect this independency and its
attributes, as sources point to many citizens arguing that secession would only lead to
slavery’s end, violence, the decimation of Kentucky’s vibrant economy, and possibly the
reversion of Kentuckians back to the state of dependency they had once held under the
Virginia gentry. While most Kentucky citizens held no ill will towards the South, nor
condoned the North’s actions, they believed that through neutrality not only might war be
avoided and the state’s loyalty to the nation it had fought to create maintained, but such a
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decision also protected their independency and the benefits white Kentuckians enjoyed.
358

Secession, however, was to middle-class Mississippians an opportunity to defend
their understanding of power, which from settlement included their right to slaves, the
right to govern their own states, and control over their wealth and futures. As previously
noted, Mississippi’s settlement created close-knit communities that valued personal
relationships over political parties. Mississippians felt that their interests were best
represented by men they knew personally and who best protected what they valued, also
known as antipartyism. Additionally, a Mississippian’s identity was dependent on one’s
reputation that was shaped by how masculine, honorable, and trustworthy an individual
was in the community. Any remark or action that insulted a man’s reputation or
community, or questioned his honor and masculinity, was often met with violence. For
example, when “free soil” ideology and the Republican Party “questioned the moral
character of individual southerners” and “their social system,” that is, their use of slavery,
southern men, and Mississippians as a whole, felt their honor as good, Christian
individuals threatened.359
Furthermore, when the Republican Party accused the South’s institutions as “a
relic of barbarism” and supposedly “no longer respected [Mississippians] as equal
Americans, white men, and Christians” because of slavery, Mississippians sought
“satisfaction” through violent action.360 Simply put, white Mississippians, especially the
middle and upper-classes, seemed to believe that Free Soil supporters, abolitionists, and
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the North in general, did not see them as moral Christians who deserved equality as
American patriots who helped shape the nation. To them, “Republican propaganda
labeled . . . their way of life as inferior, morally degenerate, and unworthy of national
experience,” and sought to remove the ability to move slavery westward into new
territories. Seeing no wrong in slavery’s practice—believing that Christianity defended
it—viewing themselves as individuals whose ancestors had fought to establish the nation
in the past, and hoping to reassert themselves as patriotic Christians, white
Mississippians, specifically men, turned to violence to reclaim their honor and
reputations. After all, it was rumored that “more men died violently in Mississippi than in
all six New England states” simply because they took political rhetoric personally, valued
their reputations, and were quick to prove themselves in ways they saw as manly,
courageous, and worthy of the public’s respect. Ultimately, then, Mississippians “called
for an open, aggressive, and appropriately manly response” to these accusations, and they
chose secession as that action.361
Yet, leading the state into disunion was not simply a response by male, white,
Mississippians to reassert power over their reputations. It was also a way to protect their
right to a labor institution that had brought great wealth to the state. Mississippi itself
contained the majority of slaveholding households in the South, and “Free Soil
Republicanism” threatened that wealth, might increase competition between blacks and
middle- to working-class Mississippians, and also eliminate the possibility of increasing
one’s wealth and social status over time, similar to the belief of white Kentuckians. To
eliminate slavery meant an end to prosperity and also a chance to expand into territories
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with soil that has not been worn out by cotton. In addition, the freeing of slaves created a
fear in the minds of upper- and middle-class Mississippians of racial warfare—an event
they had been prevented through violence and brutality by a minority surrounded by a
larger, slave majority.362 Moreover, blocking slavery’s extension also meant the end to
“local control,” yet they also viewed its loss of the South’s ability to make their own
decisions and govern their futures—that is, a loss of southern rights. Therefore, the
South, and Mississippi included, believed that they would have no power in national
decisions, or the financial and social futures of their states, if a Republican president was
in office, as he would see to the destruction of the rights that allowed them to accomplish
these tasks. More specifically, white most elite and middle-class Mississippians between
1859 and 1861 believed that preventing the movements or eliminating slavery, a loss of
local control over a state’s destiny, and the questioning of the South’s honor and
“American heritage” was a direct attack to the power they held over their lives and which
threatened to degrade them to mere slaves themselves under the control of the North.363
Therefore, in an attempt to save this power over their wealth, liberty, and honor as men
and Americans, elite politicians and middle-class Mississippians chose secession,
whereas in the eyes of some middle-class Kentuckians, secession was no clear solution
and even threatened what they held dear.
Secession also brought with it the possibility of not only regaining power, but also
untold prosperity. Some historians have contended that Mississippi was planning and
waiting for the opportunity to expand the region southward decades earlier, as they
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believed that there might not be any hope to move slavery into the West. By separating
from the Union, elite citizens believed they could initiate plans to expand into places like
Cuba, South America, and the Caribbean, while eliminating excessive taxing and
reopening the slave trade. Ultimately, their hope was to build a confederacy that would
“rival Rome in its palmy days, ” for the “enormous wealth [Mississippi] is now pouring
into the lap of the North, would at once be withdrawn and become tributary to Southern
prosperity and Southern power.”364 While these ideas had been defeated between 1837
and 1859, scholars argue that by 1860, Mississippians were convinced that their success
was hindered while in the Union and believed that the state would be better off
economically outside of the Union.365
Both elite and middle-class Mississippians’ support of secession was highly
influenced by their value on power and its dependence on honor and slavery as an
institution that not only brought prosperity to the state, but also provided great wealth to
any citizen who aspired to it. Viewing the Republican Party as hostile to the state’s hopes
of expanding westward, these groups believed themselves to be hindered economically
and threatened by the prospect of seeing slavery come to an end and becoming slaves
themselves to the North. Additionally, white Mississippians took the ideals of
abolitionists and the doctrines of Republicans as insulting to southerners’ honor—an
insult that needed to be reprimanded through violence in order to show the North that
Mississippians were moral, Christian Americans worthy of a voice in the nation and their
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state’s future. Therefore, white Mississippians of both classes viewed secession as a
violent act to maintain their power over their honor, their slaves, their wealth, and their
white privileges.
Ultimately, between John Brown’s raid and the secession crisis of 1860 and 1861,
Kentucky and Mississippi showed vast similarities. Both cherished slavery as an
institution that not only made up the majority of each state’s wealth, but also provided
social privileges to whites. These states also valued southern rights—the ability of
southern states to have a say in decisions that directly affected their states and to hold
slaves—and believed that the Republican Party, and later Lincoln’s policies, were a threat
to the South. Yet, even though these states valued their slaves, their rights, and their
wealth, Kentucky and Mississippi chose different paths when it came to secession in
1861. Instead of following other southern states into disunion, Kentucky continued to
hold onto hope that America’s democratic system would prevail in silencing the sectional
tensions racking the nation, even as the Deep South began to separate itself from the
Union one state at a time. Also, Kentucky, in valuing slavery, believed that the Lincoln
administration would not have the ability to eradicate the practice, while also trusting that
the Union’s current laws concerning slavery protected it the most. While it has been
shown that middle-class citizens might have led the state into secession had a convention
soon after Lincoln’s election, or even after Fort Sumter, this group nonetheless saw how
detrimental secession and war might be, rendering the state a battlefield while its slaves
escaped in increased numbers with no reassurance that they would be returned.
Therefore, in disapproving of the North’s actions towards the South, while also dissuaded
by the threats secession might ensue, the majority of middle-class Kentuckians chose the
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middle ground—neutrality, in order to protect their independency which depended on
slavery, the economy, and white privileges.
As for elite and middle-class Mississippians, what they saw as continued northern
aggression, as well as a Republican victory, seemed to be a personal attack to their power
and the practices they depended on to improve the economy, their wealth, and their social
statuses. Holding onto the belief that insults to one’s honor and reputation should be met
with violent action, middle-class Mississippians chose secession to reassert themselves as
American patriots and as men. In addition, Mississippians, mainly the elite, also saw
secession as an opportunity to expand the South and slavery into the Caribbean and South
America, increasing the state’s wealth and keeping themselves from becoming slaves
also. In sum, secession was seen by elite and middle-class Mississippians as the only way
to sustain and reassert their power over slavery, their honor, their wealth, and their rights,
while also freeing themselves from a Union that they believed was stifling further
economic prosperity, slavery’s expansion, and their liberty.
Despite the events that followed July 1861, which are beyond this particular
study, both states eventually found themselves in the middle of a war that possibly
fulfilled their worst fears. Both states witnessed devastation to their populations, crops,
livestock, churches, schools, and ultimately to slavery itself. Moreover, while Kentucky
experienced class conflict prior to neutrality, Mississippi witnessed this same conflict, yet
during the war and in the form of conscription laws and desertions made by its once
enthusiastic, loyal soldiers. In the end, however, both states, regardless of the outcomes
they faced, shared yet another similarity by the fall of 1861 by finding themselves
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involved in a war that altered not just their own, respective states, but the nation as a
whole.
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– CONCLUSION

Kentucky ended its neutral position on September 11, 1861 after forces from both
sections invaded the state. Believing that the South had been the first to break neutrality,
Kentucky sided with the Union, but an influx in enlistments revealed a continued division
among Kentuckians as over 90,000 troops fought for the Union and 30,000-40,000 joined
Confederate units. Even more demonstrative of these divisions were the unsatisfied
secessionists who chose to create their own provisional legislature in Bowling Green,
Kentucky, which was eventually accepted into the Confederacy and fulfilled the long
awaited vision of some middle-class Kentuckians who longed to defend southern rights
and fight for the Confederate States. Yet, with a total of seventy-one percent of the
population of the state choosing not to participate in the war, it can be argued that both
elite and middle-class Kentuckians, ingrained with the belief in the superiority of
whiteness, the economic independency achieved through hard work, and a devotion to the
state itself, perhaps still believed in neutrality even as the state sided with the Union.366
On the other hand, Mississippi, having raised 170 companies by July 1861,
defended their beliefs at a collection of battles in cities like Corinth, Jackson, and
Vicksburg. Yet, as the Confederate Army suffered a series of defeats, the once great
enthusiasm that captivated the population evolved into a determination to simply survive.
While Kentucky might have witnessed class conflict prior to neutrality, Mississippi saw
its social classes divide during the war, with yeomen losing faith in elite leaders who
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forced the poor to fight through threats and later conscription laws.367 As a result, and
having too long been separated from their families, Mississippi soldiers resorted to
desertion to return home and provide for their kinfolks. Mississippi’s economy also
became “shattered beyond repair” with a debt that grew to nine millions dollars, the
destruction of the state’s rich agriculture, the growth of political polarization, and the
emancipation of slaves. Nevertheless, despite such events, scholars have argued that
Mississippians retained an air of “passionate rebellion,” specifically towards
emancipation, and refused to accept the freedom of slaves and the loss of their own racial
superiority in ways that affected society well into the twentieth century.368
While the Civil War might have witnessed these two, similar states to venture in
two different directions, this study has used John Brown’s raid, the 1860 election, and the
secession crisis to reveal just how similar middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians
were but also how their identities and founding ideas caused them to choose their own,
respective paths in 1861. Following John Brown’s attack on Harper’s Ferry, upper,
middle, and working-class Mississippians and Kentuckians were vastly similar in their
belief that the Republican Party’s doctrines drove Brown to action, forcing them to take
measures to refortify their defenses to keep a close watch on their slaves and prevent
further insurrections in each state. Yet, while each state might have acknowledged the
supposed threat that the Republicans and abolitionists might have held on their
institutions, they differed on what other steps needed to be taken in order to protect the
social and economic privileges white Mississippians and Kentuckians enjoyed.
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Middle-class Kentuckians held onto its faith in the democratic system to protect
its state’s rights, and while some Mississippi unionists joined them in such a belief, other
middle-class Mississippians insinuated that secession was the state’s only option,
especially if Lincoln was elected. Nonetheless, sources reveal two states mostly
advocating for the maintenance of the union in 1859, and as the 1860 election
approached, citizens believed that choice candidates were the only hope in helping to
keep slavery active and themselves protected from a perceived northern threat. During
the campaign season, white Mississippians and Kentuckians advocated for two particular
candidates—John Bell and John C. Breckenridge—believing that these men could protect
slavery, southern rights, and/or the Union as a whole. Specifically, Bell supporters
favored his vow to maintain the Union, while removing the slave question from politics,
while Breckenridge was seen as secessionist just waiting for the opportune moment to
destroy the Union. Breckenridge supporters, on the other hand, detailed his strengths as a
pro-southern rights man who would protect the South’s interests, while Bell’s perceived
abolitionist tendencies often garnered much distaste among this particular group.
Ultimately, it was in these men that middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians placed
their hopes, but as Abraham Lincoln won the presidency in November 1860, these hopes
were dashed and these two states began to drift apart.
It was not, however, that middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians were
suddenly unalike during the secession crisis. Both groups still valued slavery and
southern rights and did not approve of Lincoln nor his actions at Fort Sumter in April
1861, but it was how best to protect themselves and their founding ideas that they
differed. Viewing Lincoln’s election as unacceptable and the Union as no longer the
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nation their ancestors had fought for, Mississippi accepted secession as a manly, violent
alternative that would protect their southern honor and communities from subjugation
and inequality, while also sustaining their wealth, slavery, futures, and most of all, their
power over all these practices. Kentucky, joining Mississippi in its disapproval of
Lincoln, saw class divisions emerge as the state struggled to decide what to do. While
compromise efforts were tirelessly sought prior to April 1861, the battle at Fort Sumter
caused Kentucky to quicken its decision. Fearing a loss of power, however, the political
parties of the state presented neutrality as a safer, temporary option for the state, and
some middle-class Kentuckians favored this decision, as it protected their independency
which valued northern and southern economic ties and the white privileges enjoyed
through slavery. Secessionists, however, believed that their rights as southerners were
threatened, disapproved of politicians’ support of neutrality, and advocated for secession,
if not leaving the state entirely to fight for the Confederacy.
Such decisions, this study has argued, were the direct result of the identities and
founding ideas of independency and power that Mississippi and Kentucky created upon
settlement in the 1700s. Mississippi consisted of southern confederates who valued not
only the institution of slavery, but most of all power over their slaves, honor, and liberty.
To both upper- and middle-class Mississippians, Lincoln’s election meant a loss of that
power and the ability to have a say in the decisions that affected their reputations, wealth,
and the state’s future, while opening the door to possibly becoming slaves themselves to
the North. Citizens also took the Republican’s attack on slavery as an attack on their
honor, which could only be sustained, they believed, by an equally violent action. For this
state, that violent action was secession itself. As for Kentucky, its decision to remain
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neutral was influenced by middle-class citizens’ viewing themselves as neither southern
nor American, but as solely Kentuckian. To be a Kentuckian, in their eyes, meant to
value the Union, the state’s diversified economy, and the system of slavery which
credited white males with economic and racial superiority, but most importantly,
independency. To the majority of middle- and working-class Kentuckian, choosing one
section over the other meant directly harming this independency by going against their
sister states in the South, losing economic relations with the North or South,
emancipating slaves, or abandoning white superiority. Additionally, citizens were
unwilling to watch their state became a battlefield between both sections; thus, they chose
the middle ground to not only keep the war out, but also to maintain their independency
and their social and economic privileges.
Later, J. M. Alexander wrote “I pledge myself to defend the state of Kentucky,” to
Kentucky’s Governor, Beriah Magoffin, while informing him of the formation of the
“Independent Rangers.” Acknowledging the “Fifty Sprightly young men good horsemen
and Sharp-Shooters,” Fulton County attested to Alexander’s loyalty, but also their further
need during such trying times, wanting “this company for our own protection” as
Kentucky pursued neutrality.369 Contrarily, Hinds County, Mississippi, witnessed just
how much anger Mississippians held towards Lincoln’s victory. Wiley P. Harris, a
secessionist candidate for the secession convention in the county, stated that despite
running against cooperationists, all candidates “professed to be united on secession as the
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ultimate remedy.” Eventually voting for the secession ticket, Hinds County declared a
“basic, unanimous belief that resistance, and probably secession, was the proper response
to a Republican ascendency.”370 While brief, these few examples represent the larger
differences between Mississippi and Kentucky as 1861 drew to a close as outlined in this
study. While Mississippians stood united in their goals to retain their power and secede,
Kentuckians chose to remain neutral in order to protect their privileges, institutions, and
independency. Even so, the paths these states’ citizens chose morphed as the war carried
on far longer than anticipated, specifically in the case of Kentucky, but it cannot be
denied that what both middle-class Mississippians and Kentuckians valued was similar.
Both states cherished their belief in slavery as a constitutional right, as well as the belief
in a state’s ability to govern its own decisions and interests, but each state’s founding
ideas caused these once similar states to deter away from one another. In the end, they
pursued pathways that they believed protected these ideas, and what each consisted of,
the most even if it meant severing ties with their sister states in the South or with the
Union that they had fought and sacrificed for so long.
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